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ABSTRACT
In the last decade, the Internet has up-ended the world of politi-
cal fundraising, helping campaigns marshal armies of small donors
and volunteers.  Rather than eliminating the need for fundraising
organizations as some predicted, the Internet has created new in-
termediaries that capitalize on the rapidly changing ecology of online
fundraising.  These new intermediaries combine fundraising, volun-
teer mobilization, and activism.  They raise new risks of accountabil-
ity, polarization, and nationalized debate, but they also have the
potential to enhance democratic participation.  This Article contrasts
online and offline fundraising intermediaries and provides a guide
for regulating online political fundraising to avoid unintended con-
sequences, to minimize the risks of online fundraising, and to rein-
force the Internet’s potential for enhanced democratic participation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
You probably have never heard of Trevor Lyman.  He is not a
political operative.  In fact, before the 2008 election, he was not in-
volved in politics at all.1  On November 5, 2007, however, he “engi-
neered” one of the “largest single-day fundraising haul[s]” of all
time—a “moneybomb.”2  On October 18, 2007, Lyman launched This-
November5th.com, a website that called on supporters of Ron Paul, a
long shot Libertarian candidate for the Republican presidential nomi-
nation, to donate to his campaign on one specific day.3  When the
dust cleared, the Ron Paul campaign had netted over $4,000,000 in a
single day.4  Only a month later, Lyman did it again, engineering a
$6,000,000 take for Ron Paul on December 16, the 234th anniversary
of the Boston Tea Party.5  Small donations and new donors fueled
both moneybombs.6  According to a campaign spokesman, the drive
1. Kenneth P. Vogel, Ron Paul Becomes $6 Million Man, POLITICO (Dec. 16, 2007, 10:58
PM), http://politico.com/news/stories/1207/7421.html [hereinafter Vogel, $6 Million
Man].
2. Id.
3. Kenneth P. Vogel, The Man, The Technique Behind Paul’s Haul, POLITICO (Nov. 6,
2007, 9:06 PM), http:/www.politico.com/news/stories/1107/6746.html [hereinafter Vo-
gel, The Technique]; see REMEMBER THE 5TH OF NOVEMBER, http://thisnovember5th.com/
(last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (displaying video of Ron Paul and linking visitors to another
online fundraising intermediary).
4. Vogel, The Technique, supra note 3.
5. Vogel, $6 Million Man, supra note 1. R
6. See Vogel, The Technique, supra note 3 (suggesting that Lyman’s website aimed to R
solicit smaller contributions from a large number of people).
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on December 16 raised funds from 24,940 new donors.7  Just as re-
markable as his success is Lyman’s description of the nationwide cam-
paign that made it possible: “It’s just a website that said ‘hey let’s all
donate money on this day’ . . . .  [I]t just propagated virally.  And
that’s really it.”8
To organize his moneybombs without the Internet, Lyman would
have needed to buy materials and postage for the millions of direct
mail solicitations that would be necessary to generate a comparable
number of donations.  He would have needed to pay for a mailing list
to target his audience (if such a targeted list were even available).  He
would have needed an army of employees to process the flood of do-
nations.  His workers’ salaries alone—not to mention all of his other
expenses—would have severely diminished his eventual fundraising
haul.
The institution most likely to attempt a Lyman-style moneybomb
pre-Internet would have been a campaign, political party, or other
well-established fundraising organization.  These intermediaries ab-
sorb the costs of mobilizing large groups of voters, volunteers, and
donors, connecting potential contributors with campaigns.9  They
bundle small donors into easily accessible groups, making the sort of
small-donor fundraising that Lyman relied upon economically via-
ble.10  This intermediating role has made fundraising organizations a
powerful political constituency in their own right, with the potential
to hold politicians accountable and to become vehicles for special in-
terests.11  Lyman used the Internet to sidestep this established struc-
ture, effectively transforming himself into a fundraising intermediary
overnight.
Despite Lyman’s efforts on behalf of Ron Paul, no campaign typi-
fied the transformation of fundraising and organizing in the 2008
election more than Barack Obama’s campaign.  With one of
Facebook’s founders as its “online organizing guru,” the Obama cam-
7. Vogel, $6 Million Man, supra note 1. R
8. Vogel, The Technique, supra note 3. R
9. See Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Beginning of
the End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN L. REV. 1729, 1767 (2001).
10. Cf. James H. Oddie, Comment, Fighting Speech with Speech: Combating Abuses of Section
527 Political Organizations with More Speech, Not Additional Regulation, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 179,
203 & n.156 (2005) (noting that “political parties reported an increase in the number of
small donors in 2004”).
11. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85
VA. L. REV. 1627, 1651 (1999) (“Political parties, for example, contribute money to the
candidates, make independent and coordinated expenditures on the candidates’ behalf,
and conduct issue advocacy campaigns designed not only to win a majority in the legisla-
ture but also to exert discipline.” (footnote omitted)).
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paign set out to maximize the benefits of online fundraising and out-
reach.12  The campaign raised hundreds of millions of dollars in small
donations from millions of donors via the Internet.13  Although cam-
paigns are one of the oldest forms of fundraising intermediary, the
Obama campaign transformed itself into anything but a traditional
campaign, raising money and engaging volunteers at record breaking
levels.14
The rise of Internet fundraising has done more than empower
individual voters.  It has also brought online fundraising in-
termediaries like MoveOn.org, an organization that channeled
$88,000,000 to the Obama campaign during the 2008 election,15 to
the fore.  These online intermediaries can be central to the success or
failure of national campaigns, and have been even more important for
state and local contests, in which candidates do not have the resources
or popularity to attract contributors directly.16
The mere fact that intermediaries in general remain important
for online fundraising, however, does not erase the Internet’s poten-
tial to enhance democratic participation in American politics.  At
their best, intermediaries help individual voters organize, speak out,
and influence candidates.  At their worst, they are megaphones for
special interests and funnels for soft money.  This Article argues that
to understand the impact of the Internet on democratic participation,
we should begin with the offline fundraising intermediaries that have
long been the topic of political and legal debate and ask how these
traditional intermediaries differ from the new online intermediaries.
This Article makes two key contributions to the larger debate
over fundraising intermediaries.17  It draws on political science litera-
12. Brian Stelter, The Facebooker Who Friended Obama, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2008, at C1
(internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Jose Antonio Vargas, Obama Raised Half a Billion Online, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2008,
8:00 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/11/20/obama_raised_half_a_bil-
lion_on.html.
14. Id.
15. MOVEON.ORG, PEOPLE-POWERED POLITICS 2008: POST-ELECTION REPORT 4 (2008)
[hereinafter MOVEON.ORG 2008 POST-ELECTION REPORT], available at http://
s3.moveon.org/pdfs/moveon_postelectionreport_ah14.pdf. See generally MOVEON.ORG,
http://www.moveon.org/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
16. See generally, e.g., MOVEON.ORG 2008 POST-ELECTION REPORT, supra note 15, at 9 R
(describing MoveOn.org’s efforts to help elect a Democratic governor in North Carolina).
17. For more discussion of political intermediaries, see generally JOHN H. ALDRICH,
WHY PARTIES?: THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA (1995);
NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS: AN APPRECIATION OF PARTIES AND PARTI-
SANSHIP (2008); SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN
POLITICS (1995); A USER’S GUIDE TO CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (Gerald C. Lubenow ed.,
2001)
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ture to identify six distinct types of fundraising intermediaries, three
offline and three online: political parties, independent fundraising
groups (“IFGs”), bundlers, online IFGs, partisan blogs, and fundrais-
ing platforms.18  It also uses this framework to compare the impact of
different types of fundraising intermediaries on democratic participa-
tion and examines the consequences of a shift toward online
fundraising.19
Although online fundraising intermediaries offer opportunities
for enhanced democratic participation, they also pose significant
risks.20  Chief among these risks is the question of whether the new
media will carry enough accountability to compensate for the in-
creased power that intermediaries will wield through Internet commu-
nities.21  The 2010 midterm election threw this concern into stark
relief; intermediaries made more independent expenditures than in
the 2008 election and almost six times the independent expenditures
made in 2006.22  Nearly fifty percent of outside spending during the
2010 election was by 501(c) groups that made no disclosures of their
funding sources.23  Two important sources of these funds in the 2010
election were unions and corporations, newly freed from limits on
their election spending by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.24
Since 2008, many commentators have called for regulations that
would limit fraudulent online contributions, improve disclosure, and
encourage campaigns to rely on small donations.25  Bearing the risks
18. See infra Part II.A–C.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part III.A–E.
21. See infra Part III.E.
22. Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespend-
ing/index.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (showing that independent totals dropped from
approximately $211 million in 2010 to approximately $157 million in 2008 and approxi-
mately $37 million in 2006).
23. 2010 Outside Spending by Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/
outsidespending/index.php (follow “By Groups” hyperlink under “Outside Spending”;
then select “Non-party Committees” under “Select Filter”; then select “By Disclosure”
under “Spending by Disclosure for Non-Party Committees”) (last visited Feb. 27, 2011)
(demonstrating that a large percentage of expenditures were made without disclosures
during the 2010 election).
24. 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (holding that limiting independent political expendi-
tures of corporations and unions is unconstitutional).
25. See, e.g., ANTHONY J. CORRADO ET AL., CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., AM. ENTER. INST., &
BROOKINGS INST., REFORM IN AN AGE OF NETWORKED CAMPAIGNS: HOW TO FOSTER CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION THROUGH SMALL DONORS AND VOLUNTEERS 3, 40–43 (2010), available at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/Reform-in-an-Age-of-Networked-Campaigns.pdf (presenting a
comprehensive package of reforms designed to expand the role of small donors in polit-
ics); Michael J. Malbin, Small Donors, Large Donors and the Internet: The Case for Public Financ-
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and opportunities of online fundraising in mind, this Article closes by
identifying several areas where online fundraising would benefit from
regulation.26  These include: the risk of fraudulent contributions; the
need to refine disclosure requirements to address the fact that most
online fundraising intermediaries earmark donations by their mem-
bers rather than donating themselves; and the need to support small
donations and the correlated increase in political volunteering.27
Many of the challenges that these regulations pose can be ad-
dressed by the careful application of information technology.  For ex-
ample, a software package that allows a trusted third party to remotely
monitor campaign disclosure databases would reduce the transaction
costs of regulation, improve transparency, and allow the software itself
to resolve many of the more complex regulatory challenges.28
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three parts.  Part II
draws on political science literature to outline the legal development
of political intermediaries, to catalogue online and offline fundraising
intermediaries, and to outline five ways that intermediaries can en-
hance democratic participation.  Part III uses this framework to com-
pare online and offline intermediaries and identify the many benefits
and risks posed by Internet fundraising.  It concludes with cautious
optimism: Although there are measurable risks, the potential benefits
of online fundraising for democratic participation are significant and
achievable.  Part IV examines potential regulation of online fundrais-
ing through the lens of Part III’s comparison of online and offline
fundraising intermediaries and makes specific recommendations
aimed at supporting the benefits and mitigating the risks posed by
online fundraising.
II. INTERMEDIARIES, DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION, AND ONLINE
FUNDRAISING
Scholars predicting the impact of online fundraising on Ameri-
can politics are divided largely into two camps.29  One group foresees
rapid transformation—a sharp increase in direct citizen participation,
ing After Obama, (Campaign Fin. Inst., Working Paper, Apr. 2009), available at http://
web.posc.jmu.edu/parties/readings/Topic%204%20Campaign%20Finance/Presidential
WorkingPaper_April09.pdf (arguing that the campaign fundraising system should be rede-
signed in order to promote competition, candidate emergence, and public participation).
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Part IV.A–B.
28. See, e.g., Part IV.B.2.
29. See, e.g., Nick Anstead & Andrew Chadwick, Parties, Election Campaigning, and the
Internet: Toward a Comparative Institutional Approach, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF IN-
TERNET POLITICS 56, 58–59 (Andrew Chadwick & Philip N. Howard eds., 2008) (“Since the
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the “democratization” of American politics, and the eventual sidelin-
ing of traditional political intermediaries.30  The other group expects
that existing intermediaries will ultimately absorb the new techniques
and media.31  This group argues that, despite some initial disruption,
the traditional power structure will eventually reassert itself.32  This
group has been especially critical of claims about the democratizing
nature of online media.  For instance, Professor Matthew Hindman,
one recent critic of the democratizing potential of the Internet, has
argued that the rise of online media has simply moved the goalposts.33
Rather than making it hard to publish political expression, Professor
Hindman argues that the increasing online cacophony makes it hard
to get political expression heard.34
Actual events, thus far, seem to lie somewhere between these two
extremes.  The Internet has not eliminated fundraising in-
termediaries.  Instead, traditional fundraising intermediaries have in-
corporated online techniques,35 and new online intermediaries have
developed that channel fundraising dollars, public attention, and vol-
net’s early days, analysis of its political impact has been dominated by two distinct schools
of thought: the normalizers . . . and the optimists . . . .”).
30. See, e.g., ANDREW CHADWICK, INTERNET POLITICS: STATES, CITIZENS, AND NEW COMMU-
NICATION TECHNOLOGIES 129 (2006) (“The explosion of blogging has democratized access
to the tools and techniques required to make a political difference through content crea-
tion.”); Anstead & Chadwick, supra note 29, at 58 (explaining that “optimists . . . claim that R
the internet will reform politics and radically redistribute political power”).
31. See RICHARD DAVIS, THE WEB OF POLITICS: THE INTERNET’S IMPACT ON THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM 5 (1999) (“Rather than acting as a revolutionary tool rearranging politi-
cal power and instigating direct democracy, the Internet is destined to become dominated
by the same actors in American politics who currently utilize other mediums.”).
32. See id.; MICHAEL MARGOLIS & DAVID RESNICK, POLITICS AS USUAL: THE CYBERSPACE
“REVOLUTION” 2 (2000) (“Whatever the future revolutionary implications of cyberspace, we
are convinced that it will be molded by the everyday struggle for wealth and power.”).
33. See generally MATTHEW HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY (2009).
34. Id. at 13 (“[T]he Internet is not eliminating exclusivity in political life; instead, it is
shifting the bar of exclusivity from the production to the filtering of political information.”);
see also id. at 18 (“While it is true that citizens face few formal barriers to posting their views
online, this is openness in the most trivial sense. . . .  [W]e care most not about who posts
but about who gets read—and there are plenty of formal and informal barriers that hinder
ordinary citizens’ ability to reach an audience.  Most online content receives no links, at-
tracts no eyeballs, and has minimal political relevance.”).
35. See, e.g., Press Release, EMILY’S LIST, EMILY’s List Announces Launch of Online
Rolodex (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.emilyslist.org/news/releases/launch_online_
rolodex/ (detailing an online social networking and fundraising tool recently released by
EMILY’s List, a long-established, democratic-leaning political fundraising organization);
Nathaniel Gleicher, Survey of Democratic and Republican State Parties (2010) (unpub-
lished study) (on file with the Maryland Law Review) (surveying state Democratic and Re-
publican parties and finding that all had websites, ninety-nine out of 100 had online
donation links on their sites, and eighty-four used social networks as a part of their constit-
uent outreach).
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unteer resources in ways that no offline fundraising intermediary ever
could have.36  These intermediaries have grown quickly, transforming
themselves from sideline curiosities in the 2000 election to game
changing power players in 2008.37
To understand the impact of online fundraising on democratic
participation in America, one must first understand the role of politi-
cal intermediaries in the electoral process.  This Part briefly outlines
historical attitudes toward political intermediaries and identifies the
roles they have traditionally played in American politics.  It lays out
U.S. campaign finance law and identifies the types of fundraising in-
termediaries—offline and online—that exist today.  Finally, using the
decades-long debate on political parties as its source, it extracts five
ways that fundraising intermediaries can enhance democratic partici-
pation.  These five factors will later be used as a rubric to compare the
effect of online and offline fundraising intermediaries on democratic
participation.
A. Fundraising Intermediaries and Campaign Finance Law
Political intermediaries—first political parties and, more recently,
other institutions that raise money, organize voters, and provide re-
sources to campaigns—have been in existence for centuries.38  Candi-
dates, who often have more constituents than they can interact with
directly, rely on fundraising intermediaries to group potential sup-
porters together, allowing more efficient contact.39  Constituents, who
may not have the time or resources to evaluate all candidates them-
selves, rely on intermediary labels (Democrat, Republican, and en-
dorsements from special interest groups like the National Rifle
Association or the American Civil Liberties Union) to help evaluate
possible candidates.40  Because of their role as go-betweens and their
ability to easily raise money and other resources, fundraising in-
36. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 3–8. R
37. See, e.g., Aaron Smith, The Internet’s Role in Campaign 2008, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE
PROJECT (Apr. 15, 2009), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1192/internet-politics-campaign-
2008 (finding that the percentage of adults who use the Internet for political news and
information has increased from four percent to forty-four percent since 1996).
38. See, e.g., 1 F.P. LOCK, EDMUND BURKE: 1730–1784, at 283 (1998) (quoting Edmund
Burke as stating that “‘[p]arty divisions . . . whether on the whole operating for good or
evil, are things inseparable from free government’”).
39. See Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 11, at 1629–32, 1638 (explaining that “[p]olitical R
intermediaries increase the meaningfulness of individual political participation” and re-
duce costs).
40. See ALDRICH, supra note 17, at 49–50 (“Party affiliation provides an initial reputation R
that reduces decision-making costs and provides a core of likely supporters.”); BERNARD R.
BERELSON ET AL., VOTING: A STUDY OF OPINION FORMATION IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 321
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termediaries wield enormous power.41  Volunteer hours, potential vot-
ers, publicity, and advocacy infrastructure are all important resources
that intermediaries gather from individuals and make available to
candidates.
The range of fundraising intermediaries has grown rapidly in re-
cent decades, as the traditional intermediary roles of political parties
have been disaggregated into many discrete organizations.42  Al-
though there have been many causes for this transition, the most con-
sistent cause has been the impact of regulation.43
Over the past half century, regulatory efforts to limit or channel
the use of money in politics have made it impractical or illegal for
political parties to perform some of their traditional roles.44  As regu-
lations have tightened around parties, the political establishment has
responded by creating new, independent organizations that carry on
parties’ preregulation activities, often with similar effects.45
In 1971, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act
(“FECA”),46 establishing contribution and expenditure limits for can-
didates and individuals in federal elections.  Under FECA, individuals
could contribute no more than $1,000 to a single candidate per elec-
tion and spend no more than $1,000 per election to directly support
“a clearly identified candidate.”47  This amount has increased since
FECA’s original passage: As of 2010, individual donors could contrib-
ute up to $2,400 per candidate per election.48  The FECA also deline-
ated the kinds of nonparty fundraising organizations that continued
to be permissible under its new regime.49  Often called political action
(1954) (suggesting that if a voter “knows the big thing about the parties, he does not need
to know all the little things”).
41. See Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 11, at 1631 (describing political intermediaries as R
powerful “super-agents”).
42. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 131, 157 (2005) (describing the network of new organizations that have taken the
place of official party committees in fundraising responsibilities).
43. See, e.g., id. at 158 (discussing the reorganization of party operations after the Bipar-
tisan Campaign Reform Act).
44. See id. at 156–57 (explaining that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act prohibited
major parties from raising soft money, a fundraising opportunity that major parties had
previously exploited).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 64–67. R
46. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2, 18, and 47 U.S.C.).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (1970 & Supp. VI) (repealed 1976).
48. FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, CONTRIBUTION LIMITS FOR 2009–10 (2009–2010), avail-
able at http://www.fec.gov/info/contriblimits0910.pdf.
49. See, e.g., James Weinstein, Campaign Finance Reform and the First Amendment: An Intro-
duction, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1065–68 (2002) (outlining the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence on political action committees).
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committees (“PACs”), these organizations were intended to gather
small donations from many members and then contribute directly to
candidates in turn.50  Under FECA, PACs with more than 50 members
could donate $5,000 per candidate per election, while PACs with
fewer than fifty members were subject to the same donation limits as
individuals.51
In addition to limiting contributions and expenditures, FECA
also required that fundraising organizations disclose details about all
donations received, including the identity of all donors over a particu-
lar threshold,52 which is $250.53  Finally, a 1974 FECA Amendment
created the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) to enforce the law
and publish reports of campaign disclosures.54  These requirements,
later endorsed by the United States Supreme Court, were intended to
increase the transparency of candidate funding and reduce political
corruption.55
In 1976, however, FECA’s campaign finance framework was for-
ever transformed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v.
Valeo.56 Buckley upheld FECA’s contribution limits and disclosure re-
quirements but struck down its expenditure limitations, holding that
such limits violate the First Amendment rights of candidates and
other political participants.57  This ruling breathed new life and power
into PACs,58 which are well positioned to amass large war chests of
funding.59  The FECA’s post-Buckley framework allowed PACs to spend
these resources with little restriction so long as their actions were not
“coordinated” with the candidates they supported.60  A 1978 advisory
50. See Bradley A. Smith, The Sirens’ Song: Campaign Finance Regulation and the First
Amendment, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 30 (1997) (asserting that “PACs allow small donors to band
together to increase their political clout”); Weinstein, supra note 49, at 1065 (defining R
different kinds of PACs and noting that statutory definitions encourage PACs to include
small contributions from many people).
51. Weinstein, supra note 49, at 1065 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A), (a)(4) (2000)). R
52. Melvin I. Urofsky, Campaign Finance Reform Before 1971, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1, 49
(2008).
53. 2 U.S.C. § 434(c)(1), (c)(2)(C) (2006); 11 C.F.R. § 109.10(b) (2010).
54. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–55).
55. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976).
56. 424 U.S. 1.
57. Id. at 58–59.
58. See Geoffrey M. Wardle, Comment, Time to Develop a Post-Buckley Approach to Regulat-
ing the Contributions and Expenditures of Political Parties: Federal Election Commission v. Colo-
rado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 603, 610–11
(1996) (“[A]s a result of Buckley, large institutional contributors have proliferated.”).
59. See Issachaaroff & Ortiz, supra note 11, at 1651–52. R
60. Emma Greenman, Strengthening the Hand of Voters in the Marketplace of Ideas: Roadmap
to Campaign Finance Reform in the Post-Wisconsin Right to Life Era, 24 J.L. & POL. 209, 223
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opinion issued by the new FEC complicated matters further, explain-
ing that FECA did not limit contributions for state elections or “party
building” projects like voter registration.61  Money and resources fun-
neled to parties through this loophole came to be known as “soft
money.”62  Despite efforts to reduce political spending in the years
after FECA and Buckley, the amount of money spent on political cam-
paigns has increased,63 and PACs spend and contribute to political
parties with an increasingly wide degree of freedom—further enhanc-
ing their stature as fundraising intermediaries.
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), also
known as the McCain-Feingold Act after its principle sponsors, was
intended to respond to the loopholes left behind by FECA, Buckley,
and subsequent decisions.64  The BCRA targeted soft money directly,
prohibiting its use by party committees.65  The political establishment
responded to this new constraint by founding private, nonprofit 527
and 501(c) organizations to accept the money that could no longer be
sent directly to party committees.66  In turn, these intermediaries
make “uncoordinated” expenditures that are carefully calibrated to
support their favored candidates.67  Although both FECA and BCRA
were intended to reduce the role of money in politics, both effectively
created and empowered entirely new sets of fundraising
intermediaries.
In early 2010, the Supreme Court changed the landscape of cam-
paign finance once again with its ruling in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission.68  In Citizens United, the Court overturned a sec-
tion of BCRA that prevented corporations from using money from
their general treasury funds to direct political advocacy within thirty
n.81 (2008) (noting that PACs “are allowed unlimited expenditures on independent ex-
penditures not coordinated by a candidate or the candidates [sic] committee”).  Expendi-
tures that are coordinated or controlled by a candidate or campaign are treated as
contributions and remain limited.  2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7) (2006); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46 &
n.53.
61. 1978 Op. FEC Chairman 10 pt. A (Aug. 29, 1978).
62. Weinstein, supra note 49, at 1068–69. R
63. See, e.g., Presidential Fundraising and Spending, 1976–2008, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://
www.opensecrets.org/pres08/totals.php?cycle=2008 (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (showing
that total spending has increased every election year since 1980).
64. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81 (codi-
fied primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.); Kang, supra note 42, at 156–57 R
(explaining that BCRA prohibits the kind of soft money that was left open by the
loopholes).
65. Kang, supra note 42, at 157. R
66. Id. at 157.
67. See id.; supra text accompanying note 60. R
68. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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days of an election.69  The Court concluded that independent corpo-
rate expenditures on politically focused advertising constituted pro-
tected speech under the First Amendment and that no sufficiently
compelling state interest justified their constraint.70  Corporations
could already support candidates indirectly by funding PACs of their
own but were limited in the amount they could transfer to their PACs
and when they could make such transfers.71
Citizens United also helped bring political intermediaries regis-
tered under the tax code as 501(c) organizations to the forefront.
Rather than contributing to candidates, 501(c)s concentrate on inde-
pendent expenditures—often advertising campaigns—on behalf of
candidates and issues.  By registering as 501(c)s, intermediaries es-
cape virtually all the disclosure requirements outlined in FECA and
BCRA.72  The 2010 election was by far the most expensive election in
terms of independent expenditures, due largely to an influx of these
groups.73
Corporations have already used the new ruling to raise and spend
large sums of money as political advocacy.74  At the same time, early
advocacy efforts by some companies created significant political back-
lash. For instance, a group threatened to boycott Target after it
donated $150,000 to an intermediary that supported a candidate who
opposed gay, lesbian, and transgender rights.75  It is hard to trace the
full extent of the massive influx of outside spending in the 2010 elec-
tions, because it is unclear how much was spent by 501(c) organiza-
tions that did not disclose their sources.  Nevertheless, pre-Citizens
United corporate spending through disclosed channels reveals a pat-
tern that suggests that the Citizens United decision will continue to en-
courage increased corporate political spending.76
69. Id. at 887–88, 913.
70. Id. at 900, 913.
71. Cf. David D. Kirkpatrick, Irked, Wall St. Hedges Its Bet on Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
2010, at A1 (describing a series of political donations made by the PACs of Wall Street
firms).
72. Kang, supra note 42, at 157. R
73. See supra text accompanying note 23. R
74. See, e.g., Katrina vanden Heuvel, Op-Ed., Citizens United Aftershocks, WASH. POST,
Aug. 25, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/24/AR
2010082405642.html?hpid=opinionsbox1 (describing fundraising efforts by a “consortium”
of coal mining companies in two southern states).
75. See Tom Webb, Target Apologizes for Controversial Political Donation, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS, Aug. 6, 2010, at A1.
76. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 93–95 (2010) (outlining extensive corporate political spend-
ing pre-Citizens United).
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B. Types of Offline Fundraising Intermediaries
Three dominant types of traditional fundraising intermediaries
have developed out of political candidates’ search for resources and
the efforts of regulators to constrain that search: political parties, in-
dependent fundraising groups (“IFGs”), and bundlers.  Understand-
ing the similarities and differences between these actors is the first
step in evaluating their roles in American politics.
Milton Rakove, describing the Chicago Democratic Party ma-
chine of the 1970s, wrote that an effective political party provided five
things: offices, jobs, money, workers, and votes.77  “Offices beget jobs
and money; jobs and money beget workers; workers beget votes; and
votes beget offices.”78  Rakove details a powerful, self-reinforcing insti-
tution that acts as the ultimate intermediary, drawing in and redistrib-
uting resources on all sides.79  Political parties are the oldest form of
political intermediary, but by the time Rakove was writing, party ma-
chines were not the only fundraising intermediaries—or even the only
elements of political parties—active in American politics.
Today, the range and independence of party organizations that
contribute to fundraising efforts has broadened substantially.  Candi-
dates’ campaigns, national and state party organizations, and in-
traparty fundraising organizations like the National Republican
Senatorial Committee all fundraise and organize as semi-independent
actors, swelling the ranks of political party fundraising in-
termediaries.80  The ever-expanding weave of party organizations has
led to a strong argument for reconceptualizing political parties as di-
verse coalitions of independent actors rather than contractually de-
fined organizations.  This vision of party organizations is much more
far-flung than the current, generally accepted view.
Another set of fundraising intermediaries with a long history are
what I will term independent fundraising groups (“IFGs”), organiza-
tions that raise funds for use during political campaigns but are not
directly affiliated with either a party or a candidate.  Independent fun-
draising groups might be closely aligned with a particular party—
many labor unions, for instance, tend to align themselves with the
77. MILTON L. RAKOVE, DON’T MAKE NO WAVES—DON’T BACK NO LOSERS: AN INSIDER’S
ANALYSIS OF THE DALEY MACHINE 164 (1975).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 164–65.
80. Many of these intraparty organizations, in fact, raise and spend staggering sums of
money.  The Congressional Black Caucus, for instance, raised at least $55,000,000 in con-
tributions from 2004 to 2008.  Eric Lipton & Erich Lichtblau, In Black Caucus, a Fund-
Raising Powerhouse, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010, at A1.
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Democratic Party—but they are independently operated and may dis-
agree with parties over everything from policy to candidate selection.
There are many kinds of IFGs, but they all gather political resources
and either deliver these resources to, or mobilize them on behalf of,
candidates they support.  Independent fundraising groups may be fur-
ther divided into three types: issue IFGs, influence IFGs, and institu-
tional IFGs.
Issue IFGs are independent organizations that marshal a large
membership in pursuit of a specific platform of related policy claims.
Special interest groups like the Sierra Club,81 the National Rifle Asso-
ciation,82 and EMILY’s List83 are classic issue IFGs.  Each seeks to ad-
vance its policy goals through direct advocacy and supporting
appropriate candidates.  Issue IFGs publicly endorse candidates84 and
encourage members to participate in activism;85 consequently they are
a key resource for votes, contributions, and volunteers.
Influence IFGs generally have far fewer members than issue IFGs
and often engage in little or no public outreach.  Rather than advocat-
ing for particular policy goals, influence IFGs focus on building politi-
cal influence through behind-the-scenes fundraising and
contributions.  Although any IFG could operate as a 501(c), the cur-
rent relative freedom from disclosure requirements enjoyed by
501(c)s makes such groups particularly well suited as influence IFGs.
Their reduced public accountability makes it easier for them to pur-
sue broad influence without worrying about the political ramifications
of their sometimes surprising alliances.  The prototypical modern ex-
81. Goals, SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org/goals/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2011)
(outlining the major policy goals of the Sierra Club, a well-established and influential pro-
environmentalist organization).
82. Who We Are, and What We Do, NRA-ILA, http://www.nraila.org/About/ (last visited
Feb. 27, 2011) (explaining the goal of the Institute for Legislative Action, the “lobbying”
arm of the NRA, which is “preserving the right of all law-abiding individuals to purchase,
possess and use firearms for legitimate purposes”).
83. Our Mission, EMILY’S LIST, http://emilyslist.org/who/mission/ (last visited Feb.
27, 2011) (describing the mission as “dedicated to electing pro-choice Democratic women
to office”).
84. See, e.g., Grades & Endorsements, NRA POLITICAL VICTORY FUND, http://
www.nrapvf.org/grades-endorsements.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (allowing website
users to find endorsements based on location); November 2010 Endorsements, SIERRA CLUB,
http://www.sierraclub.org/politics/endorsements/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (listing can-
didates endorsed by the Sierra Club).
85. See, e.g., Give a Gift of Life, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE, http://nrlc.org/donations.htm
(last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (soliciting member donations); Take Action, TEAMSTERS, http://
ibt.convio.net/site/PageServer?pagename=teamsters_home (last visited Feb. 27, 2011)
(calling on members of the Teamsters union to sign up for “action alerts” to help them
take action on legislative issues).
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ample of an influence IFG is the leadership PAC—a fundraising vehi-
cle that incumbent candidates use to gather and spend contributions
on behalf of their colleagues.86  Leadership PACs provide a sort of
influence or currency for incumbent candidates—donations to other
candidates may signal campaign support and the size of a leadership
PAC’s bank account also serves as a measure of the candidates’ influ-
ence.87  Because of the nature of their goals, resources, and opera-
tions, influence IFGs are the least public IFG; they rarely have an
involved membership and often operate, as do leadership PACs, on
behalf of one individual or a small group of individuals.
Finally, institutional IFGs support and represent already existing
organizations in the political arena.  One classic example is the fun-
draising arm of a labor union.  The American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organizations (“AFL-CIO”), for instance,
spent about $1.7 million during the 2008 elections.88  The AFL-CIO
and its member unions have certain traditional policy goals, such as
improving their members’ wages, healthcare, and working condi-
tions.89  Institutional IFGs also seek broader influence to promote
themselves as power players and deal makers in labor and political
circles.  Lobbying arms of corporations, such as the AT&T Inc. PAC
that spent almost $5 million dollars during the 2008 elections, are also
examples of institutional IFGs.90  Institutional IFGs are particularly
powerful players in American politics—in fact, the top twenty PAC
contributors during the 2008 elections were all institutional IFGs.91
Many of them distributed their funds nearly evenly between Demo-
crats and Republicans.92
86. Marcus Stern & Jennifer LaFleur, Leadership PACs: Let the Good Times Roll, PROPUB-
LICA (Sept. 26, 2009, 10:32 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/leadership-pacs-let-
the-good-times-roll-925 (“What separates [leadership PACs] from campaign committees is
that lawmakers are supposed to pass along the bulk of the money to other members of
their party for their campaigns.”).
87. Cf. id. (“[L]awmakers with leadership PACs can earn their beneficiaries’ support
when it comes time to divvy up committee chairmanships and other leadership posts.”).
88. PACS: AFL-CIO, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.php
?strID=C00003806&cycle=2008 (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (charting the AFL-CIO PAC’s
fundraising and spending from 1990 to 2010).
89. See, e.g., What We Stand for: Mission and Goals of the AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO, http://
www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/mission/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (describing
the organizational objectives of the AFL-CIO).
90. PACs: AT&T Inc, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.
php?strID=C00109017&cycle=2008 (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (outlining the funds raised
and expendedby AT&T in 2008).
91. Top PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/toppacs.php?
Type=C&cyle-2008 (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
92. Id.
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It remains to be seen how institutional IFGs will respond to Citi-
zens United.  The ruling removed the legal necessity for corporations
and unions to maintain separate PACs.  The backlash against some
corporations for their direct contributions in 201093 suggests that
some institutions might prefer to distance themselves from their polit-
ical giving.  Although institutional IFGs are legally distinct entities,
they remain tied to their sponsoring organizations, and their legal
separation provides little protection in this context. The top two PACs
in terms of dollar contributions during 2010 were affiliated with com-
panies, and almost all of the remaining top twenty were affiliated with
unions.94  At the same time, however, companies’ newfound ability to
donate directly to 501(c) groups, which are not required to disclose
the source of their donations, will make the influence of institutions
like corporations and unions even harder to track.  Regardless of
whether institutional IFGs will take the form of affiliated PACs or
more directly integrated lobbying groups in the future, the Citizens
United ruling will likely only increase their power in American politics.
Bundlers are the final kind of traditional fundraising in-
termediaries operating today.  Rather than donating themselves, bun-
dlers contact friends, colleagues, and associates, gathering donations
and “earmarking” them—effectively delivering stacks of checks signed
by their friends and acquaintances directly to campaigns.95  Current
law only requires the disclosure of bundling by lobbyists; because their
names are not on the checks, nonlobbyist bundlers escape most cur-
rent campaign finance disclosure requirements.96  If the bundler is
not a registered lobbyist, the recipient need only disclose the source
of the donations, not the earmarking intermediary.97  Some candi-
dates have chosen to publicly recognize their bundlers, but many can-
93. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 75. R
94. Top 20 PAC Contributors to Candidates, 2009–2010, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://
www.opensecrets.org/pacs/toppacs.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
95. Brody Mullins, Donor Bundling Emerges As Major Ill in ’08 Race, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18,
2007, at A1.
96. 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(i)(7) (West Supp. 2009) (defining the “persons” whose bundling
contributions must be reported as registered lobbyists or political committees run by regis-
tered lobbyists); see Mullins, supra note 95 (“Knowledge about these bundlers is limited . . . R
because candidates aren’t required to disclose information about them.”); see also Elisabeth
Bassett, Reform Through Exposure, 57 EMORY L.J. 1049, 1076–78 (2008) (describing lobbyist
bundling disclosure requirements imposed by the of the Honest Leadership and Open
Government Act of 2007).
97. 2 U.S.C. § 434(i)(7).
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didates do not.98  Bundlers’ anonymity can make it especially difficult
to detect the real source of campaign funding.99
Despite the regulatory concerns raised by bundling, it has ex-
panded greatly in recent elections.100  In 2000, George W. Bush pub-
licly labeled bundlers “who could raise at least $100,000” as
“Pioneers,” and raised at least $22,000,000 from bundlers during the
2000 primary election.101  In 2008, bundlers raised at least
$76,500,000 for Barack Obama and at least $75,750,000 for John Mc-
Cain.102  According to a recent study, “Bundled donations ac-
count[ed] for more than one-quarter of presidential campaign
contributions [in 2008], up from 8% in the 2000 race.”103
C. Online Fundraising: Intermediaries and the Rise of the Internet
One of the most remarkable changes that the Internet has
brought about is a drastic drop in transaction costs for group organi-
zation.104  This is not limited to political contexts—it is frequently
cited in social and economic fields.105 Before the Internet, locating
members, communicating with them, soliciting their input, and or-
ganizing them to perform tasks were costly, both in time and money.
Online organizations radically reduce these costs by using e-mail in-
stead of traditional mail and by relying on the Internet to connect
with and organize their members.  Activities that were impossible or
98. See Mullins, supra note 95 (“While some campaigns honor bundlers by name on R
their Web sites or disclose the total number of bundlers working for them, others guard
their identities.”).
99. See, e.g., Robert P. Beard, Note, Whacking the Political Money “Mole” Without Whacking
Speech: Accounting for Congressional Self-Dealing in Campaign Finance Reform After Wisconsin
Right to Life, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 731, 760 (“[B]ecause candidates need not disclose the
bundlers’ identities . . . the law effectively drives political money, even hard money, further
underground.”).
100. Mullins, supra note 95 (explaining that bundled funds have increased from the R
2004 and 2000 elections).
101. Craig Holman, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act: Limits and Opportunities for Non-
Profit Groups in Federal Elections, 31 N. KY. L. REV. 243, 273 n.166 (2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
102. Barack Obama (D): Bundlers, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres
08/bundlers.php?id=N00009638 (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
103. Mullins, supra note 95 (describing the results of a study of campaigns and watchdog R
groups conducted by the Wall Street Journal).
104. See generally CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITH-
OUT ORGANIZATIONS (2008) (providing numerous examples of situations where the In-
ternet has reduced transaction costs and encouraged online organizing).
105. See generally, e.g., id.
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inefficient before—Trevor Lyman’s moneybombs, for instance—are
suddenly not only possible, but easy to accomplish.106
Although the Internet has reduced many organizational costs, it
has not eliminated the challenges of organizing.  Reduced costs have
made new, more complex organizational structures possible, and on-
line fundraising intermediaries have arisen to exploit these new op-
portunities.  Three main types of online fundraising intermediaries
have developed to capitalize on the increasing use of the Internet in
politics: online IFGs, partisan blogs, and platforms.
Online IFGs are the most familiar type of online fundraising in-
termediary, because they combine elements of traditional fundraising
organizations with new tools and techniques made possible by the In-
ternet.  MoveOn.org is a classic example of an IFG that used the In-
ternet to develop into a fundraising powerhouse.107  Founded in 1998,
MoveOn.org spent about $30,000,000 during the 2004 elections,
about $38,000,000 during the 2008 elections, and more than
$28,000,000 during the 2010 midterm elections.108  FreedomWorks is
a conservative counterpoint to MoveOn.org.109  Originally an offline
IFG, FreedomWorks became an important supporting organization to
the online-organized Tea Party movement.110  It now claims over one
million members and has integrated Internet strategies into its fun-
draising and outreach efforts.111
Partisan blogs, the second type of online fundraising intermedi-
ary, couple fundraising, volunteer mobilization, and advocacy with a
suite of more traditionally journalistic roles.  Each blog represents a
clear political stance and provides political news and analysis based on
its particular point of view.  Many partisan blogs are in fact group
blogs, staffed by dozens of volunteer and/or paid correspondents that
act as community leaders.  Prominent examples of group blogs in-
clude Townhall,112 OpenLeft,113 Daily Kos,114 and RedState.115  Dur-
106. Id. at 47 (“The cost[s] of all kinds of group activity—sharing, cooperation, and
collective action—have fallen so far so fast that activities previously [impossible] are now
coming to light.”).
107. MOVEON.ORG, supra note 15. R
108. PACs: MoveOn.org, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.
php?strID=C00341396 (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
109. About FreedomWorks, FREEDOMWORKS, http://www.freedomworks.org/about/about-
freedomworks (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
110. See, e.g., Kathy Kiely, “Tea Party” Label Invites Discord, USA TODAY (Feb. 6, 2010, 2:16
PM),  http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-02-04-tea-party_N.htm.
111. See Letter from Matt Kibbe, President & CEO, FreedomWorks, to U.S. Senators
(Sept. 23, 2010), available at http://www.freedomworks.org/files/9-23-10_Reins_Act_Let-
ter_Senate.pdf (“On behalf of over a million FreedomWorks members nationwide . . . .”).
112. TOWNHALL.COM, http://townhall.com/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
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ing elections, these blogs boast daily readerships in the hundreds of
thousands, if not millions—large communities of interested potential
volunteers and contributors who have already self-filtered for political
beliefs and personal motivation.116  In addition to donations and mo-
tivated volunteers, partisan blogs also generate the press coverage and
online debate that help attract direct donations by raising candidates’
profiles.117  Thus, while partisan blogs deliver some fundraising di-
rectly through their efforts, they are far more influential in their abil-
ity to mobilize partisan activists and the voting public and to spread a
candidate’s message to communities the candidate might otherwise
have difficulty reaching directly.
Platforms are the final type of online intermediaries and are un-
like anything politics has seen before.  By logging onto the website of
an online platform, anyone, from candidates, to organizations, to indi-
viduals, can set up a fundraising page where donors can contribute
money to a political cause or candidate.118  The platform gathers
money and delivers it to the appropriate recipient, ensuring compli-
ance with all necessary laws.  Dedicated online platforms, such as Act-
Blue119 and SlateCard,120 have been especially successful, providing
both finely tuned resources and a body of users who have self-selected
based on a willingness to support political causes.121  Meetup was a
wildly successful, general-purpose intermediary platform used by the
Howard Dean campaign during the 2004 elections—volunteers
around the country used the platform to organize real-world efforts
113. OPEN LEFT, http://www.openleft.com (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
114. DAILY KOS, http://www.dailykos.com/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
115. RS: REDSTATE, http://www.redstate.com (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
116. See, e.g., Daily Kos: Site Summary, SITEMETER, http://www.sitemeter.com/
?a=stats&s=sm8dailykos (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (detailing daily traffic at Daily Kos); Red-
state.com: Site Summary, SITEMETER, http://www.sitemeter.com/?a=stats&s=s19redstate (last
visited Feb.27, 2011) (detailing daily traffic at RedState.com).
117. Jonah Perlin, Political Blogs and Netroots, PRINCETON PROGRESSIVE NATION (Oct. 18,
2010), http://princetonprogressive.com/?p=127.
118. See David Karpf, Understanding Blogspace, 5 J. INFO. TECH. & POL. 369, 379 (2008)
(describing ActBlue, which is “an online application that allows anyone, be they candidate,
interest group leader, or everyday citizen, to create his or her own fundraising page for
registered political candidates”).
119. ACTBLUE, http://www.actblue.com (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
120. SLATECARD, http://slatecard.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (on file with the Mary-
land Law Review); see also Slatecard.com, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/
group.php?gid=5953238017 (last visited Mar. 5, 2011).
121. Cf. The Quick Five Spot: Online Campaign Contributions, ARIZ. CAPITAL TIMES, July 25,
2008, available at 2008 WL 13888456 (noting that ActBlue’s and Slatecard’s successes are
due to their “decentralization”—“[t]hey allow people to create their own sites to do their
own campaigning and fundraising with family and friends who will listen to their
opinion”).
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on behalf of their candidate.122  More recently, tools leveraging
Facebook as a platform for political fundraising have begun to
emerge.123  Platforms do not endorse candidates (although they may
espouse a more general political view) and do not fundraise them-
selves.124  Instead, they empower supporters to fundraise for and or-
ganize around their favorite candidates.  The New York Times described
ActBlue as “part fund-raiser, part social-networker.”125  Funds raised
via platforms are earmarked and delivered directly to the candidate,
like a bundler, but with far more contributors making (generally)
much smaller contributions.126 More than $174,408,330 has been
raised on ActBlue since it launched in 2004.127  Clients of BlueSwarm,
a new Facebook-based fundraising application, raised more than
$45,000,000 during the 2010 election cycle.128
These three categories are not exclusive, especially for online
fundraising intermediaries.  Indeed, many intermediaries combine
multiple roles.  Both the Republican and Democratic parties, for in-
stance, offer their own social networking platforms to help voters or-
ganize and fundraise, in addition to accepting donations and
mobilizing their members directly.129  Similarly, several state parties
122. See, e.g., Gary Wolf, How the Internet Invented Howard Dean, WIRED (Jan. 2004), http:/
/www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.01/dean.html.
123. See, e.g., Glen Johnson, Political Fundraising Tool Taps Social Networks, ABCNEWS
(June 13, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?id=10903486 (describing
early successes in political fundraising over Facebook and other social networks); Ben
Smith, BlueSwarm Launches Fundraising App, POLITICO (Mar. 29, 2010), http://
www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/0310/BlueSwarm_launches_fundraising_app.html
(describing BlueSwarm, a Facebook application that enables social network-based online
fundraising).
124. Many are, however, clearly partisan.  For instance, ActBlue aims to help Democratic
candidates, and SlateCard supports Republicans. About ActBlue, ACTBLUE, http://
www.actblue.com/about (last visited Feb. 27, 2011); About the Utility, SLATECARD, http://
www.slatecard.com/about (last visited Dec. 19, 2010) (on file with the Maryland Law
Review).
125. Leslie Wayne, Act Blue’s Record Take, THE CAUCUS: N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Apr. 3, 2008,
12:43 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/act-blues-record-take/.
126. See, e.g., ActBlue Frequently Asked Questions, ACTBLUE, http://www.actblue.com/faq
(last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (“We can directly contribute to and coordinate with candidates,
and can transmit earmarked contributions from individuals to candidates.”).
127. ACTBLUE, supra note 119. R
128. Johnson, supra note 123. R
129. E.g., GOP, http://our.gop.com/app/render/go.aspx?xsl=tp_community.xslt&User
Token= (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (calling on visitors to join and use the GOP social
network to plan offline events, to share news, videos, and blog posts, and to connect with
their communities); PARTYBUILDER, http://my.democrats.org/page/content/party
builder/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (encouraging visitors to become members, social net-
work, plan events, and run their own fundraising campaigns on behalf of Democratic
candidates).
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have rolled out their own fundraising and social networking plat-
forms.130  Perhaps the most interesting examples of multirole online
intermediaries have grown out of the Tea Party movement, a grass-
roots upwelling of conservative activists that spawned numerous orga-
nizations.131  Rather than having a clear hierarchy, the Tea Party
movement is an agglomeration of numerous local and national
groups, brought into a loose alliance by virtual connections.132  While
some of these organizations act primarily as community organizing
destinations or IFGs, others, such as Tea Party Nation, incorporate
elements of IFGs, platforms, and partisan blogs.133
Finally, it is important to note that, although the previous two
Sections have drawn a clear distinction between online and offline
organizations, the line is much blurrier in practice.  I define an online
fundraising intermediary as one that has thoroughly integrated online
technologies and strategies into its day-to-day operations.  Thus, many
prominent online fundraising intermediaries are, in fact, offline in-
termediaries that have embraced new media.134  The central question
that this Article concentrates on is not whether an intermediary’s
roots lie in online or offline media but how the intermediary’s increas-
ing reliance on online media has changed the way it operates.
TABLE 1
Types of Online and Offline Fundraising Intermediaries
OFFLINE ONLINE
Independent Fundraising Online IFGs
Groups (IFGs)
Policy-Focused
Institutional
Influence-Focused
Bundlers Partisan Blogs
Political Parties Platforms
130. See, e.g., MYMSGOP, http://mymsgop.org/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (online
home of the Mississippi Republican Party); TNDP, http://www.tndp.org/main/authoriza-
tion/signUp?target=http://www.tndp.org/profiles (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (online
home of the Tennessee Democratic Party).
131. See Jonathan Rauch, How Tea Party Organizes Without Leaders, NAT’L J., Sept. 11,
2010, at 29, 29 (detailing the rise of the Tea Party movement).
132. Id.
133. See TPN: TEA PARTY NATION, http://www.teapartynation.com/ (last visited Feb. 27,
2011) (incorporating blogs, social networking, and member mobilization).
134. See, e.g., EMILY’S LIST, http://emilyslist.org/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2011);
FREEDOMWORKS, http://www.freedomworks.org/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
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D. Why Intermediaries Are Valuable in a Democratic Society
Although fundraising intermediaries have been shaped by politi-
cal influence-peddling and enabled by loopholes in federal regula-
tion, they also enhance democratic participation by providing voters
with avenues to donate their money and their time.  If it is true that
“[w]hat makes a culture democratic . . . is not democratic governance
but democratic participation,”135 then the potential for access that fun-
draising intermediaries offer is central to American democracy.  Dif-
ferent kinds of interaction, of course, can have different
consequences for democratic participation.  Volunteering, whether
door knocking, phone banking, or organizing at a local headquarters,
is a “directly collaborative activity” that strengthens “[a] community’s
stock of social capital.”136  It draws more citizens into the process and
provides for increased opportunities for debate and political engage-
ment.  This suggests that contributions of time, and contributions of
money that lead to contributions of time, are particularly valuable for
democratic participation.137
As political parties are the oldest, most entrenched, and most
studied fundraising intermediaries, there is a rich literature that dis-
cusses the benefits and risks they pose.138  From this debate, it is possi-
ble to identify five ways that fundraising intermediaries increase
democratic participation within American politics: Fundraising in-
termediaries can (1) increase the political engagement of their mem-
bers, (2) aggregate their members’ opinions into a single voice loud
enough to reach candidates’ ears, (3) shape public debate, (4) hold
politicians accountable by influencing elections, and (5) be held ac-
countable by their members and the public.  An intermediary that ac-
complishes all five of these roles would be a boon to democracy and
might be preferable even to direct engagement between candidates
and constituents.  Examining each of these functions in turn will pro-
vide a rubric for evaluating the impact of any particular fundraising
135. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression
for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 35 (2004).
136. Michael J. Malbin et al., The CFI Small Donor Project: An Overview of the Project and
Preliminary Report on State Legislative Candidates’ Perspectives on Donors and Volunteers 4, (Cam-
paign Fin. Inst., Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n, Aug. 29,
2007), available at http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/books-reports/cfi_small-donor_APSA-
paper_2007.pdf.
137. See id. at 19 (noting that “at least some small donor contributions [may be] social
activities” and commenting “that . . . contributions for a nontrivial number of small donors
[may be] a gateway form of participation”).
138. See generally, e.g., ALDRICH, supra note 17. R
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intermediary on democratic participation.  I use this rubric in Part III
to compare online and offline intermediaries.
First, intermediaries enhance their members’ political engage-
ment by allowing them to express and debate their political beliefs
and to associate with a group that shares those beliefs.139  A demo-
cratic culture is built on the ability of its citizens to debate.  It relies on
the fact that “everyone—not just political, economic, or cultural
elites—has a fair chance to participate.”140  Intermediaries provide
this opportunity to their members by offering fora for discussion and
opportunities for citizens to engage directly through debate, advo-
cacy, and donation.  In addition, intermediaries allow individuals to
identify themselves with causes that are meaningful to them.  As the
Supreme Court noted in NAACP v. Alabama,141 “Effective advocacy of
both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones,
is undeniably enhanced by group association.”142  The Court reaf-
firmed this right in Buckley v. Valeo, noting that the First Amendment
protects “[t]he right to associate with the political party of one’s
choice.”143  Thus, effective intermediaries allow individuals to align
themselves with particular causes by becoming members and provide
them with opportunities to debate, discuss, and take action—to en-
gage in the political process.
Second, intermediaries aggregate the desires of their members.
Political parties, according to their great defender Edmund Burke,
are bodies “of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours
the national interest.”144  This joint promotion is what enables groups
of citizens to compete with the wealthy and powerful.  Most voters
could not individually muster the resources to even cover a candi-
date’s time spent calling constituents or traveling to a fundraiser.  In-
termediaries help small donors aggregate their resources and
139. For example, many of the partisan blogs described above allow users and members
to comment on articles and interact with each other on discussion boards.  Specifically,
Daily Kos provides its members with the ability to maintain personal diaries, which are
rated and commented on by other users. Diaries, DAILYKOS, http://www.dailykos.com/dia-
ries (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
140. Balkin, supra note 135, at 4. R
141. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
142. Id. at 460; see also id. at 466 (finding that compelling the NAACP to reveal its mem-
bership rolls violated its members’ First Amendment right to free association).
143. 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (alteration in original) (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S.
51, 57 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. EDMUND BURKE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS OF THE
SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL, AND OTHER PRE-REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS 271 (David Womersley
ed., 1998).
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command the attention of candidates whose limited time and high
expenses otherwise pressure them to concentrate on wealthy donors.
One of the guiding principles in democratic theory is that each
citizen should not only have a voice in politics, but that his voice
should be “clear, loud, and equal: . . . equal so that the democratic
ideal of equal responsiveness to the preferences and interests of all is
not violated.”145  Ensuring equality is perhaps most challenging in the
realm of political giving because each citizen does not have a single,
equally valued vote to spend.  If this equality is not ensured, it can lead
to a participatory distortion when the group that is most politically
active does not represent the larger community.146 The demographics
and political views of more affluent citizens do not match those of the
general population—for instance, they tend to have more conserva-
tive views on economic issues than the general population.147  If their
voices are louder than their proportional representation, the demo-
cratic representativeness of the system as a whole suffers.148  Short of
further restraints on contributions and funding that would likely vio-
late the First Amendment, the aggregative power of fundraising in-
termediaries is a prime counterpoint to the power of wealthy
donors.149
Third, intermediaries shape public debate by bringing important
issues to the fore, by providing informational cues to political partici-
pants, and by engaging in negotiation with other intermediaries to
simplify their members’ choices.150  Many citizens may not have the
time or the resources to fully evaluate the policy questions and the
candidates on which they are asked to vote.  For these citizens, in-
termediaries provide heuristic cues—labels that serve as shortcuts to
145. VERBA ET AL., supra note 17, at 509. R
146. Id. at 178–85.
147. Id. at 480 (“[I]n both parties the more affluent have more conservative economic
views.”).
148. See Clyde Wilcox, Contributing as Political Participation, in A USER’S GUIDE TO CAM-
PAIGN FINANCE REFORM, supra note 17, at 109, 116  (“Giving may be an additional source of R
political inequality, expanding the political voice of the advantaged and channeling a dis-
torted image of public opinion into government institutions.”).
149. Intermediaries’ aggregative role has become even more important in the wake of
Citizens United, which empowered corporations to directly enter the political fray. See supra
text accompanying notes 68–71. R
150. See, e.g., ALDRICH, supra note 17, at 49 (“[T]he collective action problem for voters R
of becoming sufficiently informed to make a (possibly preliminary) determination of
whom they favor is greatly attenuated, given party affiliation and perhaps other reputa-
tional cues.”); Philip E. Agre, Real-Time Politics: The Internet and the Political Process, 18 INFO.
SOC. 311, 312 (2002) (“Political parties and legislatures, for example, do not simply trans-
mit information; they actively process it, especially by synthesizing political opinions and
interests into ideologically coherent platforms.”).
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help them identify which causes and candidates they should sup-
port.151  A voter might not be able to investigate a particular candi-
date’s stance on environmental policy, but if the voter often agrees
with an environmental intermediary, for example, he could use that
intermediary’s endorsement as a key factor in his decision.152
More generally, intermediaries “are integral to democratic delib-
eration, and deliberation elucidates their significance.”153  In-
termediaries set the public agenda and ensure progress on that
agenda in three key ways.  Most simply, intermediaries present individ-
ual points of contact for the “discovery process of negotiation,” nar-
rowing the field of interested parties from hundreds of millions of
voters to thousands of intermediaries.154  This helps make national ne-
gotiation in a country as large as the United States possible.  More
than just acting as representative negotiators or points of contact, in-
termediaries also ensure that issues of importance to the populace be-
come central to political debate.  An unconnected mass of
environmentally conscious voters, for instance, is poorly suited to fo-
cusing political attention on environmental issues.  Environmental in-
termediaries, however, have the resources, political knowledge, and
public influence necessary to insert themselves meaningfully into pub-
lic debate.155  Part of this power comes from the aggregated voices of
their members, but part also comes from the skills and experience of
the intermediaries themselves.  Further, fundraising intermediaries
shape political debate by influencing the attitudes of their members.
For instance, it is unlikely that every member of the American Farm
Bureau (“AFB”) agrees on how to prioritize agricultural policy goals
or what tactics should be used in pursuit of these goals.156  By recom-
151. See Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through
Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1149–51 (2003) (providing a
brief introduction to heuristic cues).
152. See, e.g., Arthur Lupia, Dumber than Chimps? An Assessment of Direct Democracy Voters, in
DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY? THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 66, 67 (Larry J.
Sabato et al. eds., 2001) (using as an example a voter’s selection of Bill Clinton for Presi-
dent based on his endorsement by the Sierra Club).
153. ROSENBLUM, supra note 17, at 307. R
154. Agre, supra note 150, at 312. R
155. See, e.g., GREENPEACE INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT ’09, at 29–31 (2009), available at http:/
/www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/publications/greenpeace/
2010/Annual_Report_2009/AR2009.pdf (describing the amount of money raised and
spent by Greenpeace in 2009).
156. See We Are Farm Bureau, THE VOICE OF AGRIC.: AM. FARM BUREAU, http://
www.fb.org/index.php?fuseaction=about.home (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (“[American
Farm Bureau] is the unified national voice of agriculture, working through our grassroots
organization to enhance and strengthen the lives of rural Americans and to build strong,
prosperous agricultural communities.”).
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mending policy goals to its members, the AFB uses its expertise to
rally them to specific goals.
Fourth, intermediaries hold politicians responsible for their ac-
tions and help ensure that their members’ voices influence their rep-
resentatives.157  For individuals to play a meaningful part in the
political process, their participation must have “more than a negligi-
ble probability of influencing the outcomes toward which that partici-
pation is directed.”158  The ability of intermediaries to aggregate and
represent their members and to shape public debate will have little
impact if the intermediaries cannot influence political actors to ad-
vance those interests.  While individual constituents may have diffi-
culty directly influencing their representatives, a powerful
intermediary’s threat to withhold supporters, voters, and contributors
can exert meaningful pressure.159  This influence can be a two-edged
sword, however.  Although influence is necessary for intermediaries to
empower individual citizens, unchecked influence transforms in-
termediaries from loudspeakers for the concerns of citizens to an-
other megaphone that drowns them out.
This concern raises the final role of fundraising intermediaries—
the role that must provide a check to all the influence described in
the previous four roles.  Intermediaries should themselves be held ac-
countable for their actions and endorsements by their members and
the public sphere.  This will ensure that intermediaries wield their in-
fluence in service of, rather than in competition with, the citizens they
represent.  Membership accountability is the most talked about form
of pressure that intermediaries might face.  Professors Persily and
Cain discuss two relevant concepts—voice and exit.160  Voice provides
members with a means to “work within the organization . . . to influ-
ence its positions, decisions and leadership.”161  Exit provides them
with a realistic opportunity to leave the intermediary should they be
unable to sway the intermediary’s direction.162  If “voice” is the carrot,
157. Morris P. Fiorina, The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics, DAEDALUS,
Summer 1980, at 25, 26 (“[O]nly if those elected know they will be held accountable for
the results of their decisions (or nondecisions, as the case may be), do they have a personal
incentive to govern in our interest.”).
158. MICHAEL MARGOLIS & GERSON MORENO-RIAN˜O, THE PROSPECT OF INTERNET DEMOC-
RACY 6 (2009).
159. Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 11, at 1650–51. R
160. Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A Reassessment
of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 797–98 (2000) (borrowing the terms
“voice” and “exit” from Albert O. Hirschman (citing ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE,
AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4–5 (1970))).
161. Id. at 797.
162. Id. at 797–98.
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then “exit” is the stick—members’ threat to depart lends credibility to
their efforts to influence the intermediary.  A robust exit right relies
not only on the qualities of the intermediary but also on the space in
which the intermediary operates: How easy is it for dissatisfied mem-
bers to depart for a competing organization?; How many alternative
groups are there?.  These factors can compel intermediaries to respect
the wishes and arguments of their members and to ensure that their
acts are shaped by their entire membership, not merely by a small
undemocratic steering committee.163
In addition to being responsive to their members, intermediaries
should also be responsive to the public sphere.  As Professors Is-
sacharof and Pildes have noted, “[A]ppropriate democratic politics
[is] akin in important respects to a robustly competitive market . . . .
Only through an appropriately competitive partisan environment
can . . . the policy outcomes of the political process be responsive to
the interests and views of citizens.”164  Thus, intermediaries must be
open to challenge and criticism by other intermediaries, by journal-
ists, and by individual candidates and activists.  To be publicly criti-
cized, of course, an intermediary must act within the public sphere.
Thus, the public (or nonpublic) nature of intermediaries will have a
significant impact on whether they are meaningfully accountable.  It
should be of little surprise that the ability of 501(c)s to keep their
funding sources largely secret raises serious concerns about the likeli-
hood that they will fulfill this final goal of fundraising intermediaries.
In these five ways, intermediaries operate as more than just neces-
sary evils of representative politics.  They enhance democratic partici-
pation and reinforce the democratic process.  Although some
intermediaries may be little more than foils for special interests,
others empower the public’s voice in elections and enhance the effi-
ciency of the political and legislative process.  Identifying the effective-
ness of particular fundraising intermediaries operating in these five
roles will help reveal whether they are a positive, democratic influence
on the political process, or whether they are merely avenues for fun-
neling money to candidates.
163. See id. at 798 (“For example, the prospect of the Christian Coalition or Right-to-Life
Party running its own candidates in a general election ensures that the Republican candi-
dates, such as George W. Bush, will think twice before alienating them from the Republi-
can Party by compromising their position on abortion.”).
164. Samuel Issacharof & Richard H. Pildes, Politics As Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 646 (1998).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-3\MLR304.txt unknown Seq: 28 10-MAY-11 13:53
2011] MONEYBOMBS AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION 777
III. CONTRASTING ONLINE AND OFFLINE FUNDRAISING
INTERMEDIARIES
The role of fundraising intermediaries in American politics pro-
vides a backdrop against which the rise of online fundraising can be
examined.  This Part compares the effectiveness of online and offline
fundraising intermediaries in each of the five roles identified in the
previous Part.  This comparison reveals that, while the Internet has
not eliminated the need for political intermediaries, as some had
hoped, it has changed how intermediaries operate.  Online in-
termediaries certainly pose risks, especially in the area of accountabil-
ity, but they also have the potential to enhance democratic
participation in American politics.
A. Member Engagement
The reduced transaction costs of organization on the Internet en-
able online intermediaries to interact with a larger membership more
frequently and foster more opportunities for engagement among
their members than their offline counterparts.165  The pressures of
online fundraising, whereby intermediaries aggregate small donations
and volunteer commitments from a large, disparate group of donors,
make efforts by online intermediaries to engage with their members
not only possible, but necessary.  The resulting increase in online in-
termediaries’ member engagement increases democratic participa-
tion in three main ways: it makes citizen participation easier; it
exposes contributors to other, more active forms of engagement such
as volunteering; and it creates more continuous relationships between
members and intermediaries, fostering continued interaction and en-
gagement.  Besides increasing their members’ expression and engage-
ment, online intermediaries also raise concerns about the
demographics of online fundraising, the Internet’s ability to national-
ize public debate, and donors’ ability to make anonymous
contributions.
The lower transaction costs of online contributing and volunteer-
ing makes it much easier for citizens to engage with the democratic
process; simplified citizen participation makes it possible for online
intermediaries to quickly amass large memberships.166  Offline in-
165. See generally Brian S. Krueger, A Comparison of Conventional and Internet Political Mobil-
ization, 34 AM. POL. RES. 759, 760 (2006) (“[T]he Internet offers a communication channel
that radically reduces the costs of political mobilization efforts.”).
166. Cf. id. at 670–71 (suggesting that transaction costs are transferred from the institu-
tion to the individual).
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termediaries can also command large memberships, but it is remarka-
ble how quickly online intermediaries have come to rival even the
largest of their offline counterparts.  For example, the Sierra Club,
with 1.4 million members, was founded in 1892.167  The AFL-CIO, one
of the largest unions in the United States, was founded in 1955 by the
merger of two older unions and currently boasts 12.2 million mem-
bers.168  In comparison, MoveOn.org already has 5 million mem-
bers—almost five times as many as the Sierra Club and close to half as
many as the AFL-CIO—despite being barely a decade old and having
no external institutional support.169  The large memberships of online
intermediaries mean that they can easily engage more citizens in the
democratic process than traditional, offline intermediaries.
A related question concerns the quality and depth of the interac-
tions that take place within these large groups.  Scholars break social
connections into weak ties (shallow relationships) and strong ties
(strong, meaningful relationships).170  The disconnected nature of
online communications tends to support weak ties more easily than
strong ones.171  Weak ties are better at connecting communities than
at eliciting action—although many people support causes on
Facebook, few take action beyond that initial click of their mouse.172
One risk of online engagement is that it will weaken meaningful social
interaction by replacing strong-tie, offline networks with weak-tie, on-
line networks.
While it is certainly true that many online connections are weaker
than their offline analogs, this criticism misses three critical points.
First, this criticism is only a concern if online engagement replaces
real-world engagement.  The low-level commitment required by on-
line political activity may instead attract people who would not other-
167. Welcome to the Sierra Club!, SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org/welcome/ (last
visited Feb. 27, 2011).
168. About Us, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
169. About the MoveOn Family of Organizations, MOVEON.ORG, http://www.moveon.org/
about.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
170. See generally Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360
(1973) (dividing social connections into strong and weak ties and outlining the differences
between the two).
171. Malcolm Gladwell, Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted, NEW YORKER,
Oct. 4, 2010, at 42; see also Granovetter, supra note 170, at 1366 (“Intuitively speaking, this R
means that whatever is to be diffused can reach a larger number of people, and traverse
greater social distance . . . when passed through weak ties rather than strong.” (footnote
omitted)).
172. See, e.g., Kim Hart & Megan Greenwell, To Nonprofits Seeking Cash, Facebook App Isn’t
So Green, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/04/21/AR2009042103786.html (finding that only a small percentage of
Facebook members join causes and noting that even fewer donate to those causes).
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wise take part—even weak engagement is better than no engagement
at all.  Second, online engagement does not take place in a vacuum.
Online intermediaries expose contributors to multiple forms of politi-
cal engagement, from fundraising and phone banking to volunteering
for local campaigns.  By acting as one-stop shops, online fundraising
intermediaries can actually draw weakly committed online activists
into more significant forms of political engagement.173  As a result of
this crossover, online contributors are more likely to participate in
other kinds of political activity than are their offline counterparts.174
Third, in contrast to offline fundraising, many of the activities in
which online intermediaries’ members engage are fundamentally
communal, from letter writing to canvassing local neighborhoods, and
thus embody stronger social ties than pure monetary donations.175
These forms of engagement compel participants to connect with
other citizens and to engage in the debates and discussions that un-
derpin the democratic process.
The increase in online intermediaries’ member engagement also
exposes contributors to other, more active forms of engagement.  On-
line intermediaries must do more than just process donations.  They
must coordinate and support their members’ volunteer efforts.  As a
result, many online intermediaries’ websites feature social communi-
ties176 and facilitate real-world meetings between members,177 two
strategies that enhance member engagement and increase volunteer-
ism.  Combining advocacy and fundraising greatly increases member-
173. See, e.g., MOVEON.ORG 2008 POST-ELECTION REPORT, supra note 15, at 3–4 (touting R
the 2.14 million calls made by members and the “over 933,800 volunteers” turned out for
the Obama campaign).
174. See, e.g., INST. FOR POLITICS, DEMOCRACY & THE INTERNET, GEORGE WASHINGTON
UNIV., SMALL DONORS AND ONLINE GIVING: A STUDY OF DONORS TO THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGNS 22–24 (2007), available at http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/federal/president/
IPDI_SmallDonors.pdf (finding that twenty-three percent of online donors who gave $100
or less in 2004 planned to volunteer in 2008, compared to only six percent of offline do-
nors of like amounts; similarly, twenty-one percent of online donors who gave $500 or
more in 2004 planned to volunteer in 2008, compared to only twelve percent of offline
donors).
175. Cf., e.g., id. at 29–30 (“Online donors were far more likely to forward e-mail.”).
176. See., e.g., Sarah Lai Stirland, Finally, a Facebook for Republican Campaign Donors, WIRED
(Oct. 8, 2007), http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2007/10/slatecard (explaining,
in the words of Slatecard’s co-founder, that “people can not only support candidates with a
donation, but they can also support that person within their social network” and noting
that undecided voters can use Slatecard to see who friends or public figures are endorsing
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
177. See, e.g., TPN: TEA PARTY NATION, supra note 133 (including an interactive list of R
upcoming events that allows members to post and organize their own events); Wolf, supra
note 122 (noting that supporters of Howard Dean used MeetUp.com to arrange volunteer R
meetings and events during the 2004 presidential campaign).
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member and member-intermediary interaction.  Increased interaction
increases the social rewards that members reap from political engage-
ment, thus encouraging greater participation.
In addition, reduced transaction costs and the pressures of small
donor fundraising mean that online fundraising intermediaries have
more continuous relationships and frequent interactions with their
members than offline intermediaries.  Instead of distributing monthly
or annual newsletters, online intermediaries can communicate with
their members on a daily—or even an hourly—basis, allowing them to
respond quickly to new developments and shifts in member senti-
ment.  Online intermediaries can even conduct polls of their mem-
bers and use the results to inform their actions.178  By creating a
tighter feedback loop between members and intermediaries, these
communications help reassure members that intermediaries are lis-
tening and responding to their desires and encourage greater engage-
ment.  Indeed, because online intermediaries raise money largely
from individual donors making repeated, small donations,179 they
must keep their members engaged if they are to meet their fundrais-
ing goals.
Although online intermediaries increase their members’ expres-
sion and engagement, they also raise several concerns.  First, initial
studies seem to indicate that the demographics of Internet users, and
politically active Internet users in particular, are quite similar to those
of citizens who are politically active offline.180  Both groups tend to be
178. See, e.g., Jane Hamsher, 2010 Fire Dogs: Kucinich, Grayson and Weiner Win, FDL (Feb.
10, 2010, 12:31 PM), http://fdlaction.firedoglake.com/2010/02/10/2010-fire-dogs-
kucinich-grayson-and-weiner-win/ (describing a contest to identify three candidates that
best embodied the goals of Firedoglake.com in which 110,000 ballots were cast and the
website committed to fundraise and phone bank for the winners).
179. Michael Luo, Small Online Contributions Add Up to Huge Fund-Raising Edge for Obama,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2008, at A18 (noting that President Obama raised $28 million online
in January 2008, with ninety percent of that total from donors giving $100 or less and with
forty percent giving $25 or less).  But see INST. FOR POLITICS, DEMOCRACY & THE INTERNET,
supra note 174, at 17 (explaining that “[t]here was no difference in the rate of online R
giving between small donors ($100 or less) and large donors ($500 or more)—contrary to
a widely held assumption that large donors did not give online” in 2004).
180. See, e.g., Krueger, supra note 165, at 759 (arguing that reduced transaction costs R
make organizing large communities online easy, but that online organization still focuses
on citizens who are likely to be politically active offline). But see INST. FOR POLITICS, DEMOC-
RACY & THE INTERNET, supra note 174, at 17 (claiming that “[o]nline donors tended to be R
younger than other donors”).
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wealthier and more educated than citizens who are not politically ac-
tive and do not use the Internet.181
While ninety-five percent of households with over $75,000 in an-
nual income use the Internet, only sixty-three percent of those with
incomes below $30,000 use the Internet.182  While ninety-six percent
of those with a college degree or higher use the Internet, only fifty-two
percent of those without a high school diploma use the Internet.183  A
recent PEW study reached similar conclusions when comparing the
demographics of online and offline political activity.184  The commu-
nity of Internet users is still in flux, but if these trends remain con-
stant, online civic engagement will be least likely to reach those
citizens who stand to benefit the most from new opportunities for po-
litical engagement.
Although this divide is real, the barriers to online fundraising—
namely, access to the Internet and ownership of a credit card—are
less significant and less socially stratifying than those for offline politi-
cal engagement.  Offline donors often must have time to attend fun-
draisers, contacts in the proper social and political circles for
invitations to those fundraisers, and the ability to meet minimum ex-
pected donations of hundreds or thousands of dollars.  Reducing the
Internet access gap between the rich and poor in the United States
would further strengthen the promise of online civic engagement.
Even if Internet access in the United States remains skewed toward
the wealthy, however, the Internet’s lower barriers to entry mean that
more outliers may be able to defy the odds and get involved.185
A related concern about the demographics of online fundraising
is Professor Cass Sunstein’s argument that the Internet is a polarizing
medium.186  According to Professor Sunstein, the ability of Internet
users to select from a wide array of partisan news sources means that
people will gravitate to information and opinions online with which
181. AARON SMITH ET AL., PEW INTERNET, THE INTERNET AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 3, 34–42
(2009) available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2009/The%20
Internet%20and%20Civic%20Engagement.pdf.
182. Trend Data: Demographics of Internet Users, PEW INTERNET, http://www.pewinternet.
org/Static-Pages/Trend-Data/Whos-Online.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
183. Id.
184. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 181, at 36–37 (“Those with higher levels of income are R
much more likely than those at lower levels of income both to use the internet and to have
high-speed internet access at home.”).
185. Cf. id. at 14 (indicating that digital tools may facilitate political participation be-
cause activity can take place at any time of the day or night, from different locations, and at
reduced costs).
186. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at 46–97 (2007).
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they are likely to agree.187  This self-imposed intellectual segregation
tends to generate more extremist views and to reduce the opportunity
for meaningful debate on the Internet.188  Perhaps most troubling,
online faux-debates within, instead of across, political and ideological
boundaries can actually replace debate in more bipartisan fora, as po-
litical activists choose to engage through partisan online communities
rather than attend in-person events or write letters to the editor.189
This trend could deal a heavy blow to online fundraising in-
termediaries whose goal is to enhance democratic engagement.
There are several factors that mitigate the risks of online polarization,
however.  First, one recent study that analyzed the use of links to con-
nect political blogs found that significant references were made across
partisan lines.190  According to the study, liberal and conservative
bloggers posted more than 100 links to their counterparts across party
lines in a three month period.191  While far more links were posted to
blogs that agreed with the poster,192 these cross-partisan postings are
nevertheless evidence of exactly the sort of debate that demonstrates
democratic participation.  Second, as discussed earlier, it is not clear
that online discussion is replacing, rather than supplementing, offline
debate.  Indeed, because online donations act as a gateway to other,
more participatory political activities, the rise of online fundraising
could well push more people into the sort of face-to-face discussions
that are often seen as underpinning democratic deliberation.193
In addition to demographics, another factor in the online fun-
draising debate is the Internet’s ability to nationalize public debate.
Online intermediaries that are available throughout the country may
find it difficult to focus on local campaigns, and candidates may be-
come increasingly unable to ignore the resources promised them by
national intermediaries.  A candidate who raises money through a na-
tional intermediary relies not only on his own constituents but also on
a much broader range of national (and potentially international) con-
tributors.  This is particularly true for high profile races.  Scott Brown,
187. Id. at 49–50.
188. See, e.g., id. at 58–64 (discussing hate groups and group polarization, in which “peo-
ple are likely to move toward a more extreme point in the direction to which the group’s
members were originally inclined”).
189. See, e.g., id. at 69–72 (recognizing the insulation that may occur when debate is
limited to online interactions).
190. See generally Eszter Hargittai et al., Cross-ideological Discussions Among Conservative and
Liberal Bloggers, 134 PUBLIC CHOICE 67, 76–80 (2008).
191. Id. at 80 tbl.7 (indicating that there were forty-two conservative to liberal links and
sixty-three liberal to conservative links).
192. Id. at 76–80 & 80 tbl.7.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 136–37. R
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the winner of the 2010 Massachusetts Special Election, for instance,
raised large sums of money online from donors outside of
Massachusetts.194
On the one hand, nationalizing public debate brings more peo-
ple into the discussion and ties the voting population closer together.
A local congressional race that might formerly have interested only
local constituents could now be a topic of discussion and concern
across the country.  On the other hand, a candidate seeking to raise
money through national contributions must consider his positions on
national issues, not only local ones.  Accordingly, a candidate’s politi-
cal calculations may focus on factors that matter little to his direct
constituents.  Indeed, a candidate may feel compelled to conduct two
campaigns—one targeted at his local constituents and another at pro-
spective Internet supporters.  Not only does this arrangement burden
candidates, but it also risks transforming candidates from representa-
tives of their constituents on all matters into representatives on only a
few key national issues.
Another concern brought to the forefront by online fundraising
is the ability of donors to make anonymous contributions—as well as
the risk of fraud that anonymity creates.  After the 2008 election, do-
nor lists from the Obama campaign were released that included do-
nors with names like “Derty Poiiuy,” “Mong Kong,” and “Fornari
USA,” as well as numerous addresses that were obviously fake.195  Crit-
ics claimed that some Obama campaign donors avoided FECA’s dis-
closure requirements and exceeded its donation limits by making
multiple small donations with untraceable “gift cards” and under obvi-
ously false names.196  Critics argued that some of the anonymous do-
nations were, in fact, coming from overseas donors—in violation of
U.S. campaign finance law.197  The Republican National Committee
194. See Brian C. Mooney, Outside Donations Buoyed Brown, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 24, 2010, at
1.
195. Dan Morain & Doug Smith, Obama’s Fundraising Prowess Exposes Flaws in Law, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at A19; Ken Timmerman, Secret, Foreign Money Floods into Obama Cam-
paign, NEWSMAX.COM (Sept. 29, 2008, 9:23 PM), http://newsmax.com/Politics/Obama-fun-
draising-illegal/2008/09/29/id/325630.
196. See, e.g., Dan Morain & Doug Smith, Obama Fundraising Comes Under Scrutiny, NEWS-
DAY, Oct. 12, 2008, at A34 (discussing the Republican National Committee’s filing of a
complaint alleging that Obama donors exceeded donation limits); Timmerman, supra note
195. R
197. Timmerman, supra note 195.  See generally Zephyr Teachout, Extraterritorial Election- R
eering and the Globalization of American Elections, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 162 (2009) (outlin-
ing several examples of international fundraising from the 2008 elections, describing the
tools of extraterritorial fundraising, and discussing the implications of extraterritorial fun-
draising for American politics).
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even filed a federal complaint.198  Although campaigns are legally
bound to return donations from donors that aggregate to more than
FECA limits, the campaign is not even required to disclose the identity
of the donor for donations under $250.199  With no oversight, cam-
paigns have little incentive to be rigorous about rejecting or returning
contributions.
The majority of fraud allegations during the 2008 elections came
from conservative organizations, and the polarized nature of Ameri-
can elections makes it hard to evaluate the extent of actual fraud un-
derlying these claims.200  Further, because the Obama campaign was
not required to disclose detailed data on small donors, a complete
picture of individual donations is still unavailable.201  Even with unlim-
ited access to campaign records, it is unlikely that an accurate picture
of how many fraudulent donations actually took place could be
compiled.
Each form of online fundraising intermediary has distinct im-
pacts on member engagement.  Online IFGs often provide extensive
resources and support for member activism, both online and offline,
which provide members with opportunities to express their own politi-
cal opinions and debate their opinions with others.  Partisan blogs
similarly provide a space for public debate—a platform for discussion
by members who choose to take part and information for those who
merely listen.  Even platforms offer opportunities for member engage-
ment.  Social networking, which allows users to easily launch fundrais-
ing campaigns, encourages members to get directly involved, allowing
them to form their own intermediaries and to drive funding to partic-
ular candidates and issues.  Overall, online fundraising enables a
wider range of citizens to engage in the political process than offline
fundraising and changes the way that those citizens take part, making
it easier and more likely that they will discuss politics online, partici-
pate in phone banks, or even canvass.  Despite some risks, online fun-
198. Morain & Smith, supra note 195. The complaint alleged that “some of Obama’s R
small donations are illegal because they come from foreign nationals or exceed the limit.”
Id.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 52–53. R
200. See, e.g., David Freddoso, Fake Donors, Phony Pledge, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Oct. 22,
2008, 8:00 AM), http://article.nationalreview.com/376039/fake-donors-phony-pledge/
david-freddoso (strongly criticizing the Obama campaign’s handling of its online fundrais-
ing and demanding disclosure of small donations); Pamela Geller, Obama’s Campaign Con-
tribution Records Scrubbed Clean, BIGGOVERNMENT (Oct. 14, 2010, 7:13 AM), http://big
government.com/pgeller/2010/10/14/obamas-campaign-contribution-records-scrubbed-
clean/ (same).
201. See Freddoso, supra note 200 (“A pair of human eyes has to check each one, even if R
amounts smaller than $200 are not required by law to be disclosed in any report.”).
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draising intermediaries overall do a better job of engaging citizens
than their offline counterparts.
B. Aggregating Opinions
The Internet also helps online intermediaries excel at aggregat-
ing their members’ opinions into a single voice.  In particular, there
are three ways that the Internet helps intermediaries aggregate their
members’ opinions.  First, as discussed above, reduced transaction
costs allow online intermediaries to represent the interests of more
citizens, thus giving more citizens a voice in American politics.202  In-
creasing the weight behind the intermediary itself strengthens that
voice.
Second, online intermediaries can gather members that might be
beyond their reach or resources if they were operating offline, and
reduced transaction costs change the composition of intermediary
memberships.  The Internet makes it economical for intermediaries
to actively pursue small donations203 and very easy for individuals to
contribute—they simply enter an amount, enter a credit card num-
ber, and press a button.  Online fundraising also eliminates many so-
cial and geographic boundaries, helping those who do not live in a
targeted region or are not part of a politically involved social group
take part in political campaigns.  In addition, many online donors are
also first time donors.204
Third, online intermediaries can aggregate their members’ opin-
ions more accurately and be more responsive to their members’ atti-
tudes because of their frequent, interactive engagement.  The
Internet not only allows intermediaries to aggregate more and different
opinions, it also enhances the quality of their aggregation.  An offline
intermediary might interact with its members largely through dona-
tions—in some cases, donations are automatically debited from mem-
ber paychecks.205  With  donations serving as the primary barometer
202. See supra text accompanying notes 165–69. R
203. ActBlue, for instance, has a minimum donation of one dollar. ActBlue Frequently
Asked Questions, supra note 126 (explaining that a minimum donation is necessary to “en- R
sure[ ] that a campaign doesn’t spend more money processing a donation than the dona-
tion is actually worth”).
204. See, e.g., INST. FOR POLITICS, DEMOCRACY & THE INTERNET, supra note 174, at 40 R
tbl.35 (finding that sixty percent of donors who gave less than $100 online in 2004 were
first time donors, and seventy-four percent of donors who gave more than $500 online in
2004 were first time donors).
205. The United Parcel Service, for example, requires employees to contribute to Dem-
ocrat, Republican, Independent Voter Education (“DRIVE”) under their employment
agreement. See National Master United Parcel Service Agreement 8 (Dec. 19, 2007–July 31,
2013), available at http://www.tdu.org/files/ups-2008-master.pdf (“The Employer agrees
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-3\MLR304.txt unknown Seq: 37 10-MAY-11 13:53
786 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 70:750
of member interests, it may be difficult for an intermediary to even
know what its members’ opinions are, much less aggregate them.  Of-
fline intermediaries that do have more detailed interactions with their
members, however, face higher transaction costs that limit the fre-
quency and depth of these interactions.  In contrast to these limited
interactions, online intermediaries can develop an especially nuanced
understanding of what their members actually want through more fre-
quent, low-cost interactions.  In 2000, for instance, presidential candi-
date Al Gore’s website allowed visitors to select issues of interest from
a list of twenty-two issue areas and voter groups; once submitted, the
site generated a customized webpage for that visitor and encouraged
him to forward a link to the page to others.206  Thus, intermediaries
that use the Internet not only aggregate more members’ opinions but
also are more able to accurately represent their members’ opinions.
Even though online intermediaries effectively aggregate their
members’ opinions, the question of which citizens are able to become
members remains open.  The aggregative nature of online in-
termediaries offers the greatest potential to lower-income voters, who
can take part online more cheaply than offline207 and can most bene-
fit from banding together to balance the fiscal influence of wealthier
communities.  Unfortunately, citizens who use the Internet tend to be
wealthier than those who do not.208  The extent to which online in-
termediaries fail to reach poorer citizens, who have the least influence
without intermediary aggregation, calls into question their aggregative
potential.  Nevertheless, the same factors that dampened the risks of
the digital divide mentioned above209 apply here, as well.  Online
demographics are changing rapidly, but even if they remain as they
are, the barriers to online engagement are significantly lower than the
to deduct from the paycheck of all employees covered by this Agreement voluntary contri-
butions to DRIVE.”).  DRIVE is the Teamsters’s PAC. Learn More About DRIVE, TEAMSTERS,
http://www.teamster.org/content/drive (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
206. CHADWICK, supra note 30, at 155 (citing Steven M. Schneider & Kristen A. Foot, R
Online Structure for Political Action: Exploring Presidential Campaign Websites from the 2000 Ameri-
can Election, 9 JAVNOST/THE PUBLIC 43, 50 (2002)).
207. Compare MARGOLIS & RESNICK, supra note 32, at 54 (predicting that the Internet will R
not transform American politics, but rather “reinforce the status quo”), and MARGOLIS &
MORENO-RIAN˜O, supra note 158, at 150 (stating that although “the Internet has facilitated R
changes in . . . politics,” Internet politics “is largely a replication—a mirror image—of
politics in the real world,” and thus “the Internet often becomes a conduit for channeling
the passions and practices of the actors of politics”), with INST. FOR POLITICS, DEMOCRACY &
THE INTERNET, supra note 174, at 18 (stating that the Internet facilitates participation in a R
campaign because it makes it easier to give unsolicited donations, whereas offline unsolic-
ited donation is a longer process that usually must be done by mail).
208. See supra text accompanying note 182. R
209. See supra text accompanying notes 180–89. R
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barriers to offline engagement—making online intermediaries at least
an improvement, if not a complete solution.
All of the forms of online intermediaries discussed in this Article
are well suited to aggregating member opinions, though each engages
with the public in different ways.  Online IFGs have the most tradi-
tional intermediary-member relationship, distributing frequent e-mail
newsletters and soliciting donations.210  Partisan blogs have readers,
rather than members, who have a much more casual relationship with
their intermediary.211  Nevertheless, both endorse candidates, poll
their membership, and interact with the public.  Platforms are simi-
larly well suited to aggregating their members’ interests; support is
easily measured by examining the page views or donations made
through the fundraising page for a candidate or organization.212
Thus, all three forms of online intermediaries excel at effectively ag-
gregating their members’ voices.
Offline intermediaries, by contrast, are more uneven in their abil-
ity to aggregate the voices of large memberships.  While issue IFGs,
institutional IFGs, and political parties obviously pursue this goal, in-
fluence IFGs and bundlers do not.  The latter two only aggregate the
voices of small groups of members.  Leadership PACs, for instance,
often represent only a single member—the candidate whom their ef-
forts support.213  Since these intermediaries act privately and often
with no particular ideological or policy goal, it is not clear what mem-
ber opinion they might express.  Even the offline intermediaries that
do focus on large, engaged memberships struggle in comparison to
online intermediaries.214  They interact with members less frequently,
and the challenges of group governance prevent them from seeking
out member input on most intermediary decisions.
C. Structuring and Shaping Political Debate
In the same way that the Internet makes it possible for online
intermediaries to empower their members to express their views and
engage in public debate, it also affords intermediaries a greater role
in shaping and structuring political debate.  First, online in-
210. See generally supra text accompanying notes 107–11. R
211. See generally supra text accompanying notes 112–17. R
212. See generally supra text accompanying notes 118–28. R
213. See supra text accompanying notes 86–87; see also Leadership PACs and Sponsors, FED. R
ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/data/Leadership.do?format=html (last visited
Feb. 27, 2011) (listing registered leadership PACs).
214. See supra notes 166–69 and accompanying text (comparing the growth in member- R
ship of offline and online IFGs).
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termediaries’ constant stream of communication with their members
and the public increases their opportunities to influence opinions.
Rather than only declaring themselves in infrequent newsletters, or at
occasional press conferences with once-in-a-cycle endorsements, on-
line intermediaries can respond to new developments in near real
time, wielding constant influence.215  The Obama campaign, for in-
stance, generated $10,000,000 in donations in the twenty-four hours
following Sarah Palin’s acceptance of the vice presidential nomination
at the 2008 Republican Convention by appealing directly to demo-
cratic supporters.216
Second, in addition to acting as centers for fundraising, voter
identification, and volunteer mobilization, many online in-
termediaries also serve as forums for discussion.  Partisan blogs are the
perfect example, and here the Internet’s ability to empower low-cost,
high-exposure communications is particularly transformative.217  Red-
State’s Editor in Chief described his blog as “a central hub for commu-
nication in the conservative movement.”218  One of the ways that he
sees RedState fulfilling this role is through its “Morning Briefing,” a
daily e-mail sent out to all of its subscribers that highlights issues that
either are not covered in the national media or are covered with ele-
ments missing that RedState considers pertinent.219  What is said in a
daily communique´ like this has enormous power in shaping what is
talked about and how it is discussed, both online and offline.220
Other types of online intermediaries can also fulfill this role.  Be-
cause these portals become central destinations for debate, the topics
215. Indeed, web-based businesses have been developed to provide campaigns with pre-
cisely this capability—constantly communicating with supporters and the general public.
See, e.g., CAMPAIGN 2.0, http://www.completecampaigns.com/campaign20.asp (last visited
Feb. 27, 2011) (providing clients with the ability to incorporate the Internet into their
campaign strategy by using a variety of web-based communication).
216. See Obama Raises $10 Million After Palin Speech, CHARLESTOWN GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL
(W. Va.), Sept. 5, 2008, at 3A (“[T]he Obama camp promptly used the speech as a fun-
draising hook, sending an overnight e-mail to supporters to contribute.”).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 116–17. R
218. Erick Erickson on the Conservative Message, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/video/2009/12/30/VI2009123001548.html?sid=ST2010020101258
(last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
219. Id.; see also Morning Briefing: What Conservatives Read First, RS: REDSTATE, http://
www.redstatemb.com (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
220. See, e.g., Jerry Markon, New Media Help Conservatives Get Their Anti-Obama Message
Out, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2010, http:\\www.washingtonpost.com\wp-dyn\content\article\
2010\01\31\AR2010013102860.html\ (describing how one of RedState’s “Morning Brief-
ings” went viral on conservative online publications, later fueled discussion at the weekly
meetings of prominent Washington, D.C., conservatives, and was endorsed by Rush
Limbaugh).
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raised and positions advocated by the portals themselves have wide
exposure and compelling weight behind them.221  Even online in-
termediaries that do not engage in direct advocacy, such as ActBlue,
can shape public debate because they empower and amplify the voices
of a wide range of individuals.  Even the way online forums are de-
signed—Do they allow anonymous comments?  Do they privilege cer-
tain speakers over others?  Can they shape the debate that takes place
there, lending the intermediaries themselves significant architectural
power to shape discussions?—can influence the shape of political
debate.
Third, because of online intermediaries’ large memberships, they
can directly influence the attitudes of far more individuals through
internal debate than offline intermediaries.  FreedomWorks’s ability
to easily convey a direct endorsement of a candidate or position on a
particular issue to its online members provides a powerful and imme-
diate influence on public debate.222 While it is unlikely that every
member will accept the intermediary’s assertion without question,
they will likely lend it significant weight and may defend it in public
debate with nonmembers.
Fourth, the Internet has made it possible for online in-
termediaries to convey a surprisingly powerful environment of inti-
macy to their members.223  E-mails from campaigns often come from
the candidate.  Candidates release videos to their online members
before making them public, speaking to them directly, often as if the
candidate and the member were in the same room.224  High profile
speakers use casual, informal tones on services like Twitter to make
their relationship with members seem friend-to-friend rather than
221. See generally, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 186, at 138 (asserting that it seems that politi- R
cal blogs “hav[e] a real influence on people’s beliefs and judgments”).
222. See FREEDOMWORKS, supra note 134 (listing 1,122,973 total members and 701,800 R
online members).
223. Cf. Marketing Presidential Candidates on the Web Goes Mainstream: But Does It Get Votes?,
UNI>ERSIAKNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Jan. 23, 2010), http://www.wharton.universia.net/in-
dex.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=1459&language=english (quoting Jonah Berger, a marketing
professor at Wharton, as stating that “Web 2.0 allows candidates to organize and raise
money, but it also allows people to feel more connected to a candidate.  People are more
involved” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
224. Cf., e.g., Candidate Videos, ACTBLUE, http://blog.actblue.com/blog/candi-
date_videos/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (displaying videos of Democratic candidates dis-
cussing their campaigns and the importance of ActBlue’s role in their campaigns); see also
Clyde Wilcox, Internet Fundraising in 2008: A New Model?, 6 FORUM 1, 9 (2008) (describing
videos that the author received via e-mail from the Clinton and Obama campaigns and
characterizing the videos as the candidates’ efforts to foster a sense of online community).
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candidate-to-supporter.225  While it is unlikely that all of these per-
sonal interactions actually come from the high profile speakers them-
selves, many members perceive that they do, making them more
sympathetic to the intermediary’s message.
While this intimacy certainly enhances the ability of in-
termediaries to shape political debate, its two-faced nature raises the
first significant concern about online intermediaries’ enhanced ability
to shape political debate.  How asymmetrical is the seemingly “open”
nature of online fundraising intermediaries?  Can an intermediary
easily use online media to cloak itself in openness and transparency
without actually embracing these values?  At its root, this is a question
about accountability.  Does the added accountability of online scru-
tiny serve to balance out the enhanced influence accorded by online
intermediaries’ new media-based strategies?226
Professor Cass Sunstein’s warning about online polarization is
also problematic for the debate-shaping capacity of online in-
termediaries.  According to Professor Sunstein, the Internet’s po-
larized environment means that intermediaries themselves tend to be
more polarized than their offline counterparts and will become more
polarized over time.227  If the intermediaries that are shaping demo-
cratic debate become too polarized, they may paralyze political discus-
sion, rather than move it forward.228  On this point, it is important to
recall the study discussed earlier that found that online intermediaries
were not as polarized as Professor Sunstein feared.229  That study also
came to another conclusion: Over the ten month span the study con-
sidered, there was no evidence that the examined intermediaries actu-
ally became more polarized.230  Instead, cross-party debate continued
steadily throughout the period of review.231  Thus, while the Internet
may have polarizing effects on intermediaries themselves, the extent
225. See, e.g., Sarah Wheaton, Palin, Shakespeare and the Ground Zero Mosque, THE CAUCUS:
BLOG N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2010, 8:34 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/
18/palin-shakespeare-and-the-ground-zero-mosque/ (detailing several examples of infor-
mally worded tweets posted by Sarah Palin).
226. For a discussion of this question, see infra Part IV.A.
227. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 186, at 57 (“[I]t will be difficult for people armed with R
such opposing perspectives to reach anything like common ground or to make progress on
the underlying questions.”).
228. See id. at 56 (“If diverse groups are seeing and hearing quite different points of
view, or focusing on quite different topics, mutual understanding might be difficult, and it
might be increasingly hard for people to solve problems that society faces together.”).
229. See, e.g., Hargittai et al., supra note 190, at 76–80 (finding that a significant number R
of links on political blogs are made across party lines).
230. See id. at 85, 78–80, 80 tbl.6 (finding “no evidence that conservative or liberal blog-
gers are addressing each other less at the end of [the] time period than at the beginning”).
231. Id. at 85.
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of these effects is not yet clear.  If nothing else, the risk of polarization
does not seem to be worsening—the relative polarization of online
intermediaries may even decrease as more mainstream fundraising or-
ganizations adopt new media strategies.
Finally, some online fundraising intermediaries—particularly
blogs and online IFGs—serve as outlets for both news and advo-
cacy.232  As Professor Sunstein notes, online consumers increasingly
obtain their political information from online advocacy and activist
organizations.233  This dual role—reporting and advocating—lends
enormous shaping power to these intermediaries in particular.  For
instance, if a citizen receives the majority of his political information
from the diaries and blogs at Firedoglake.com,234 he will probably be
more likely to respond to a fundraising drive for candidates that the
intermediary endorses.  For one, he likely sympathizes with the organ-
ization as a result of visiting the site and likely trusts its endorsement.
Even if he might not agree with some of the endorsed candidate’s
positions, the coverage at Firedoglake.com most likely focused on the
positive aspects of the candidate—reasons for the endorsement with
which he likely agrees.  If he does not go elsewhere for his news, he
might not encounter other important facts about the candidate that
he might find troubling.  There is no ethic of neutrality for fundrais-
ing intermediaries—indeed, such a commitment would seem strange
coming from partisan entities.
Online intermediaries are clearly more effective at shaping public
debate than their offline counterparts.  Their enhanced influence
over public debate and their own members, in fact, raises concerns
over whether their mediation will enable progress or create more divi-
sion.  Although the polarization of online fundraising intermediaries
may not be as severe as Professor Sunstein warns, it could still raise
concerns.  Without proper accountability, the influence of online in-
termediaries could lend enormous manipulative power to a relatively
small group of individuals and institutions.
D. Influencing the Outcomes of Elections
If the efficacy of online intermediaries at shaping public debate
raises concerns, then their strong ability to influence the outcomes of
elections is just as troubling.  Influencing elections is the fundamental
232. In fact, many bloggers have been hired by major news magazines as a result of the
news reporting on their blogs.  Karpf, supra note 118, at 370. R
233. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 186, at 9–10 (discussing the decline of general interest R
intermediaries, such as newspapers and radio stations).
234. FDL: FIREDOGLAKE, http://firedoglake.com/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
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purpose of fundraising intermediaries, and it is central to American
democracy.  At the same time, intermediaries with too much power
may become kingmakers, holding their promised resources over can-
didates as a kind of illicit influence.  Thus, the influence of Internet
fundraising must be examined carefully to determine whether it pro-
vides too much power to the new intermediaries that it has created.
The Internet enhances the ability of fundraising intermediaries
to influence elections in several ways.  First, just as online in-
termediaries’ use of multiple kinds of political activism increases their
members’ engagement, it also increases their members’ political influ-
ence.  A candidate might court an online intermediary not only be-
cause of its fundraising potential but also to secure access to its
membership directly or to seek positive coverage in the intermediary’s
ubiquitous blog postings.  An endorsement e-mail to MoveOn.org
members, for example, might serve to raise not only money but also
other, equally valuable resources.
While, by contrast, many offline intermediaries focus on one type
of influence (bundlers and influence PACs, for instance, focus wholly
on fundraising235), some offline intermediaries also cross influence
boundaries.  Labor unions, for instance, often raise significant funds
from their members and deliver voters and volunteers to cam-
paigns.236  Even in these cases, however, the Internet lends a new de-
gree of connectedness to online intermediaries.  Online
intermediaries can build larger member bases across great geo-
graphic, cultural, and socioeconomic distances, coordinate these ba-
ses efficiently, and channel volunteers, voters, media, and dollars to
campaigns in need.237  The shift toward online fundraising has the
potential to consolidate the power of different kinds of intermediaries
into fewer organizations that wield influence over virtually every re-
source that a candidate needs to win an election.  This shift greatly
enhances the power of online intermediaries.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 86–87, 95–103. R
236. For example, the AFL-CIO, a labor union, spent about $1.7 million during the
2008 elections.  PACs: AFL-CIO, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/
lookup2.php?strID=C00003806&cycle=2008 (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).  Union members
also volunteered to urge union voters to get to the polls.  Tula Connell, A Toast: To Union
Volunteers and the 2008 GOTV, AFL-CIONOWBLOG: NEWS (Oct. 30, 2008), http://
blog.aflcio.org/2008/10/30/a-toast-to-union-volunteers-and-the-2008-gotv/.
237. See, e.g., Malbin, supra note 25, at 13 (noting that the Internet allows intermediaries R
to develop networks of volunteers cheaply); Wilcox, supra note 224, at 1–2 (positing that R
Internet fundraising allows candidates to broaden the demographic and political range of
potential donors).
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Second, having a large membership also enhances the influence
of online intermediaries.  Candidates seek donations, resources, and
potential votes, and large memberships promise access to all three.
Just as intermediaries aggregate the voices of their members, large
memberships amplify the voices of the intermediaries themselves.
Online fundraising intermediaries’ effectiveness at opinion aggrega-
tion and debate shaping gives them immense influence because in-
termediaries have very large, active memberships and are particularly
effective at mobilizing and directing those memberships.
Finally, the renewable nature of intermediaries’ relationships
with their members—so beneficial for member engagement—also
greatly enhances their power to influence elections.  Online fundrais-
ing intermediaries can go back to their contributors again and again,
an assurance that gives online intermediaries a stream of continuous
influence over candidates.  While a candidate who receives a large
contribution from an offline fundraising intermediary may not feel
beholden to them, a candidate who is supported by an online fun-
draising intermediary likely realizes that he might be able to obtain
more support from the intermediary in the days, weeks, and months
to come.
Of course, the power of this continuous relationship is only as
great as the willingness of the intermediaries to actually withdraw their
support.  Because most intermediaries are clearly partisan, their will-
ingness to abandon a chosen candidate may not be so great—it is
hard to imagine, for instance, that FreedomWorks might have thrown
its support behind Barack Obama, regardless of what John McCain
did.238  Nevertheless, the threat still holds some weight, especially dur-
ing primary elections when candidates compete for their party’s
nomination.
Each of these factors enhances the ability of online fundraising
intermediaries to influence candidates and elections.  Whether this in-
creased influence is reassuring or concerning, however, is a more
complicated question.  As with the debate-shaping discussion, deter-
mining whether online fundraising intermediaries are too powerful is
in part a question of accountability.  If online intermediaries are truly
representative of their members’ interests and the pressures of public
debate, then ensuring their enhanced influence may not be a bad
thing.  Given our societal interest in democratic debate and delibera-
tion and the importance of intermediaries as avenues for poorer and
238. See supra text accompanying notes 109–10 (explaining the conservative nature of R
FreedomWorks and its affiliation with the Tea Party).
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weaker groups to take part, enhanced influence for democratically ac-
countable intermediaries is certainly a good thing.  Without proper
accountability, a transition to online fundraising intermediaries sim-
ply trades one set of unaccountable special interests for another, po-
tentially even more powerful one.  Evaluating this question requires
turning to the final goal of fundraising intermediaries.
E. Accountability
Given the enhanced power of online intermediaries to shape de-
bate, capitalize on their membership, and influence elections, the
question of accountability is a particularly serious one.  If online in-
termediaries are more accountable to their membership and the pub-
lic than their offline counterparts, then the transition toward online
fundraising simply serves to empower their members’ voices.  If not,
then online fundraising will enhance the power of intermediaries
without enhancing—or while decreasing—their accountability.
There are certainly aspects of the online environment that work to
enhance the accountability of online fundraising intermediaries, but
there are also some outstanding questions about how accountable on-
line intermediaries really are.
First, the pressures of online fundraising provide members of on-
line intermediaries with more influence than members of offline in-
termediaries.  Members’ renewable relationships with their online
intermediaries yield power to the members.  As no single contribution
is likely to exhaust a member’s ability to contribute or volunteer, they
will continue to be valuable to intermediaries even after they have
donated.  Member threats to withhold continued support give them
exactly the kind of voice that Professors Persily and Cain described.239
At the same time, member accountability is weakened by the in-
creased membership sizes of online intermediaries.  While a small
group of wealthy donors might have some influence over a bundler,
even one hundred MoveOn.org donors represent only an infinitesi-
mal fraction of the organization’s capital.240  To wield significant in-
fluence, a dissatisfied group from an online intermediary will need to
be much larger, and this creates the additional risk that a majority of
passive members will simply swamp the efforts of those seeking to
hold the organization to account.  Although this risk is real, two as-
pects of online fundraising that have already been discussed also miti-
gate it.  For one, reduced transaction costs make it easier for
239. See supra text accompanying notes 160–63. R
240. See supra text accompanying note 169. R
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discontented members to organize against their intermediary, just as
they make it easier for the intermediary to help members organize in
support of a candidate.241  In addition, the increased frequency and
detail of intermediary-member communications make it easier for
members to identify intermediary transgressions quickly.242
Another threat to member accountability is the rise of
microtargeting.  Increasingly detailed member profiles, which include
information about where members live, their age and interests, events
they have attended, and even items they have purchased online, allow
online intermediaries to tailor their messages to ever-smaller slices of
their memberships.243  Although targeted mailings are not an inven-
tion of the Internet age,244 the ability of intermediaries to make fine-
grained adjustments to each and every e-mail is unprecedented.
Members might see different images and read different text, depend-
ing on their profiles.  A member who is a banker and has extensive
social connections on Wall Street might not learn of an intermediary’s
efforts to increase regulation of the finance industry.  This individu-
ally targeted message shaping will influence members’ perceptions of
their intermediaries and the actions in which their intermediaries en-
gage.  As intermediaries become more sophisticated in their ability to
shape member communications, the ability of members to identify
and respond to actions by their intermediary that they might normally
oppose is greatly reduced.
At the same time, the ability of intermediaries to tailor their
messages goes only so far.  Intermediaries still feel pressure to an-
nounce their causes publicly to draw sufficient resources, and mem-
bers can still seek out intermediaries’ public positions.  Although
offline member communications might not be tailored as precisely,
offline intermediaries also experience less public scrutiny of their
mass communications.  A transition to online fundraising does not re-
241. See supra text accompanying notes 104–06. R
242. See supra Part III.B.
243. See generally STEPHEN BAKER, THE NUMERATI 67–95 (2008) (describing microtarget-
ing strategies used by Republican campaigns in 2004 and efforts by Democrats to respond
in kind during 2008); David Paul Kuhn, DNC Blunts GOP Microtargeting Lead, POLITICO
(May 23, 2008, 4:54 AM) http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0508/10573.html (ex-
plaining that the DNC and RNC both “boast one vast data coffer that merges traditional
voter statistics on gender, geography, or party identification with consumer and census
data”).
244. See, e.g., Tim Taylor, All Things to All People: The Republican Party’s Use of Religious
Messages in Direct Mail During the 2004 Presidential Election, 13 GEO. PUBLIC POL’Y REV. 25
(2007) (detailing the use of targeted direct mailings during the 2004 presidential
election).
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lieve members of the responsibility to scrutinize their intermediaries,
but it does offer them new resources to pursue this scrutiny.
The susceptibility of fundraising intermediaries to public scrutiny
also changes significantly online.  Offline intermediaries often oper-
ate at best semipublicly.245  While particularly unusual, high-profile, or
extreme actions may draw some public attention, the vast majority of
actions do not. By raising funds through direct mailings, an offline
intermediary can gather thousands of contributions for a race without
ever publicly endorsing a candidate.  While FECA disclosure reports
are meant to combat this problem, the reports are often delayed and
dauntingly detailed;246 important transactions easily can be lost in
their mountains of data.  Many online fundraising intermediaries, by
contrast, rely on the public sphere for their success.  Decisions and
actions taken by these groups are taken in full public view.  Indeed,
the need to attract new members means that online intermediaries
must operate in the public sphere to survive.  While intermediaries
can operate privately online—a bundler, for instance, could use the
Internet to solicit donations from his small group of friends—doing
so means foregoing many of the benefits offered by the online public
sphere, from large memberships, to rapid growth, to the opportunity
for meteoric success.  As a result, online intermediaries are strongly
pressured to operate publicly, and every public move they take is open
to scrutiny.
This enhanced publicity has two main effects.  First, online in-
termediaries’ “contributions” to candidates are public.  As many on-
line donations are small, intermediaries must aggregate many
donations to support a candidate rather than contributing directly,
and so they solicit their members in the most public way possible.
When MoveOn.org and Daily Kos endorsed Barack Obama, for in-
stance, it was through banner headlines on their respective front
pages, each accompanied with a call to action directed at their read-
ers.247  Such a clear public declaration directs scrutiny against the en-
245. Bundlers and influence PACs are two especially private intermediaries, but all of-
fline intermediaries have an inconsistent relationship with public scrutiny.  See generally
supra Part II.B.
246. For more information on FECA disclosure reports, see The FEC and the Federal Cam-
paign Finance Law, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/
fecfeca.shtml (last updated Feb. 2011).
247. See, e.g., Press Release, MoveOn.org, MoveOn Endorsement Throws Progressive
Weight Behind Barack Obama, (Feb. 1, 2008), http://moveon.org/press/pr/
obamaendorsementrelease.html (endorsing Obama in the Democratic primary); kos,
Obama Gets the Blue Majority Endorsement, DAILY KOS (Mar. 26, 2008, 4:14 PM), http://
www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2008/3/26/125659/086 (same).
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dorsements of online intermediaries in a way that it may not be
directed against offline intermediaries.
Second, online intermediaries must not only attract large mem-
berships, they must maintain them.248  To do this, intermediaries
must continually produce public content that keeps their members
interested.  In turn, this content can be evaluated, analyzed, and criti-
cized by the general public.  Such scrutiny can generate debate, elicit
a response from the intermediary, and even compel the intermediary
to shift its position.  For instance, Markos Moulitsas, the founder of
Daily Kos, was widely criticized when he implied that he did not care
about the deaths of several mercenaries in Iraq.249  Several organiza-
tions even pulled their advertisements from the site.250  In response to
the outcry, Moulitsas qualified his remarks.251
Of course, the power of scrutiny and participation to constrain
powerful online intermediaries should not be overestimated.  Al-
though Moulitsas did respond to public criticism, his response was
hardly an unequivocal withdrawal.252  Daily Kos, like many of the most
successful online intermediaries, enjoys a significant first mover ad-
vantage—begun in 2002,253 it was one of the earliest political blogs.  It
has attained enough stature to present an imposing target to any blog
that tries to unseat it.
Although the first mover advantage of established online in-
termediaries is significant, evaluating the accountability of online in-
termediaries is a comparative exercise.  Whatever the institutional
insulation of an intermediary like MoveOn.org against competitors, it
248. See generally supra Part III.A.
249. Matthew Klam, Fear and Laptops on the Campaign Trail, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2004, at
B10 (describing Moulitsas’s original post and the resulting criticism).
250. Id.; see NohoMissives, Support Kos, DAILY KOS (Apr. 2, 2004, 9:55 PM), http://
www.dailykos.com/story/2004/4/2/194734/9122 (acknowledging that a blogger asked
readers to complain to Kos advertisers about the mercenary comments).
251. kos, Mercenaries, War, and My Childhood, DAILY KOS (Apr. 2, 2004, 5:57 PM), http://
www.dailykos.com/story/2004/4/2/175739/8203.  These public conflicts also provide
fresh opportunity for debate.  In response to the criticism of Moulitsas, a number of Daily
Kos readers mounted a campaign to signal support for the advertisers who chose to stay on
the site through donations.  NohoMissives, supra note 250 (encouraging readers to support R
Moulitsas, with several readers indicating in the comments that they did donate to advertis-
ers who remained on the site).
252. kos, supra note 251 (“I was angry that five soldiers—the real heroes in my mind— R
were killed the same day and got far lower billing in the newscasts.  I was angry that 51
American soldiers paid the ultimate price for Bush’s folly in Iraq in March alone.  I was
angry that these mercenaries make more in a day than our brave men and women in
uniform make in an entire month.”).
253. About Daily Kos, DAILY KOS, http://www.dailykos.com/special/about2#dk (last vis-
ited Feb. 27, 2011).
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is surely less than the insulation of a century-old offline intermediary
like the National Rifle Association254 or even a decades-old institution
like EMILY’s List.255  Offline, members must make phone calls, re-
search alternatives, and wait for informational mailings if they would
like to change intermediaries.  On the Internet, members can explore
alternatives with the click of a mouse.  While offline membership
often requires fees, membership online is commonly free.256  The low
transaction costs leave little overhead for intermediaries to subsidize
with memberships, and intermediaries want to amass the largest mail-
ing list possible.  Individuals can even be members of multiple in-
termediaries at the same time, allowing them to join a prospective
alternative intermediary without leaving their original group.  Thus,
just as members of online intermediaries enjoy enhanced voice in
their organizations, they also enjoy additional power to threaten exit,
if necessary.257
One more criticism of online fundraising should be addressed.  A
critic could argue that the rise of microtargeting, faux-intimate com-
munications with members, and similar Internet-powered communi-
cations techniques, allow online fundraising intermediaries to cloak
themselves in the appearance of openness while in truth remaining as
sheltered as ever.  A recent article highlighted this concern when it
reported that two secretive billionaires heavily fund many of the key
organizations within the Tea Party movement,258 making critics ques-
tion whether the Tea Party movement is the grassroots, decentralized
force that it appears to be or whether it is just a front for moneyed
interests.  If the Internet does not compel openness from online in-
termediaries, how is it any better than traditional media?
Once again, comparing online and offline intermediaries offers a
response.  The rise of the Internet does not remove the need for
members and the public sphere to scrutinize fundraising in-
termediaries, and it has not eliminated the ability of intermediaries to
act duplicitously.  It has, however, provided a range of resources that
help police intermediaries.  Leveraging these tools will ensure that on-
line intermediaries are at least as accountable as their offline counter-
254. A Brief History of the NRA, NRA, http://www.nra.org/Aboutus.aspx (last visited Feb.
27, 2011).
255. Our History, EMILY’S LIST, http://emilyslist.org/who/history/ (last visited Feb. 27,
2011).
256. E.g., Join Our Online Community, EMILY’S LIST, http://emilyslist.org/action/
signup/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 160–63. R
258. Jane Mayer, Covert Operations: The Billionaire Brothers Who Are Waging War Against
Obama, NEW YORKER, Aug. 30, 2010, at 45.
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parts—not perfectly accountable, but perhaps more accountable than
the alternative.
F. Understanding the Differences Between Online and Offline
Fundraising Intermediaries
The sheer range of distinctions raised by the previous Sections
demonstrates the difficulties policymakers face as online fundraising
expands in importance.  Online fundraising combines the already-
complex legal ecology of campaign finance law with a rapidly chang-
ing technology that promises to continue to transform fundraising,
activism, and social interaction.  The dangers of unforeseen conse-
quences—policies intended to accomplish one thing that actually lead
to something quite different—might scare policymakers into avoiding
regulation altogether.  Although the Internet is by no means mature
today, there is enough data and history concerning its impact that use-
ful guidance can be extracted from the distinctions identified above.
This guidance can, in turn, help regulators respond effectively to the
rise of online fundraising, reinforce its positive aspects, and combat
the risks that it raises.
Table 2 provides a brief summary of the benefits and risks posed
by online intermediaries. It divides these risks based on the five roles
of fundraising intermediaries identified above. Benefits and risks that
impact multiple roles are repeated.
Looking at the range of changes brought on by the rise of online
intermediaries, a few things quickly become clear.  Repeated benefits
and risks are particularly important.  The importance of the low trans-
action costs of online interaction, for instance, seems foundational to
the value of online fundraising.  Secondary characteristics that rely on
low-cost interactions, such as the ability of intermediaries to manage
large memberships, to interact frequently with their members, and to
engage their members in multiple forms of activism, also appear re-
peatedly.  Low transaction costs are an important factor in the ability
of members to scrutinize and influence their intermediaries, as well.
As for the risks of online fundraising, two clear problems are the
segmenting demographics of the American digital divide and the free-
dom from disclosure requirements that many online fundraising in-
termediaries enjoy.
In some cases, important factors also seem to operate at cross
purposes.  Large memberships, for instance, enhance engagement by
bringing more citizens into the political process, but they also hamper
the ability of online members to hold their intermediaries accounta-
ble.  Similarly, the fact that online intermediaries engage in multiple
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TABLE 2
Benefits and Risks of Online Fundraising Intermediaries
Benefits Risks
Enhance member Low transaction costs Digital divide
engagement Large memberships Nationalizes public
Engages new members debate
Continuous member-intermediary Enables anonymous
relationship donation
Multiple forms of advocacy Weak member
Frequent member-intermediary commitment
interactions
Aggregate member Low transaction costs Digital divide
voices Large memberships
Engages new members
Frequent member-intermediary
interactions leads to more accurate
aggregation.
Shape public debate Low transaction costs Potentially polarizing
Large memberships Blends reporting and
Multiple forms of advocacy advocacy
Frequent member-intermediary Faux-intimate
interactions member-intermediary
Multimedia communications interactions
Faux-intimate member-intermediary
interactions
Influence elections Large memberships Too influential?
Multiple forms of advocacy
Renewable member-intermediary
relationship
Frequent member-intermediary
interactions
Be accountable to Renewable member-intermediary Large memberships
members relationship Microtargeted
Low transaction costs messaging
Be accountable to Public endorsements First mover
the public Public content production advantages
Continuous content production Asymmetrical
openness
forms of advocacy enhances member engagement, but it also gives
these intermediaries expanded power to influence elections—power
that, if not balanced by accountability, quickly becomes problematic.
The insights offered by looking at these distinctions can be very
useful for regulators.  First, they highlight key risks that, if left un-
checked, could leave online fundraising as anything but a tool for en-
hanced democratic participation.  These insights also demonstrate
that the accountability of intermediaries continues to rely heavily on
public scrutiny, suggesting that disclosure legislation that fails to cap-
ture online intermediaries should be carefully scrutinized and likely
amended.
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Second, whenever a proposed regulation impacts the benefits
listed in Table 2, policymakers should proceed with caution.  Policy-
makers should be most concerned about regulation that might influ-
ence one of the repeated factors, especially the lowered transaction
costs of online communication.  New laws that reduce or eliminate
these benefits could weaken the force behind online fundraising and
the opportunities it offers.  Even regulation targeted at one of the
risks of online fundraising could have unintended negative conse-
quences.  Consider, for example, the risks posed by anonymous online
contributions.  There is no doubt that donors’ ability to make anony-
mous donations raises serious risks of fraud.  At the same time, requir-
ing campaigns to identify and validate all small donors would increase
the transaction costs of processing online donations.  Such regulation
would also discourage small donors who might otherwise choose to
take part in the political process.  If these added costs are not carefully
considered, they could depress online fundraising to the point that its
many positive impacts—the new contributors, increased engagement,
increased accountability of intermediaries, etc.—would be lost.259
Thus, regulators should tune their policies carefully, with special con-
sideration paid to the benefits and risks outlined above.
Before turning to the final Part of this Article, it is important to
note the risk created by the rise of 501(c) IFGs, as well.  One of the
key conclusions of this Part has been that the accountability of fun-
draising intermediaries is a central factor in their ability to enhance
democratic participation.  Unaccountable intermediaries represent
themselves rather than their members.  Because 501(c) IFGs are not
required to reveal their sources, they escape from an important form
of accountability to the public.260  Further, because they focus on in-
dependent expenditures and can easily turn to corporations and
other large donors for funding, they have little need for engaged
memberships, greatly weakening their member accountability.261
259. For more on addressing the problem of anonymous online donations, see infra
Part IV.A.1.
260. See supra text accompanying note 72. R
261. The rise of 501(c) IFGs and large corporate donors is a result of legal change,
rather than technological innovation, and falls outside the scope of this Article.  There has
already been widespread discussion of the possible implications of Citizens United and a
range of proposals to address its effects. See generally, e.g., Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note
76 (proposing changes in corporate law in response to Citizens United); Justin Levitt, Con- R
fronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2010), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676108 (outlining a narrow series of policy responses to Citi-
zens United); Daniel Winik, Note, Citizens Informed: Broader Disclosure and Disclaimer for Corpo-
rate Electoral Advocacy in the Wake of Citizens United, 120 YALE L.J. 662 (2010) (arguing for
disclosure and disclaimer regulations in the wake of Citizens United); see also H.R. 5175,
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IV. REGULATING INTERNET FUNDRAISING
This final Part builds on the framework developed in the last two
Parts and makes specific proposals to enhance the benefits and miti-
gate the risks of online fundraising.  In response to the explosion of
online fundraising and campaigning in recent elections, academics,
politicians, and policymakers have advanced numerous proposals to
reform campaign finance law.  They range from overhauls of public
financing that encourage more small online donations,262 to focused
efforts to increase the regulation of online fundraising,263 to a range
of legislation in response to Citizens United.264
This rash of proposals is a significant change from the status quo.
In an effort to protect the developing Internet from undue burdens,
policymakers in recent years have largely chosen to shield online enti-
ties from traditional legal burdens.  For instance, little effort is made
to collect sales taxes on interstate sales made online,265 and publishers
are almost completely protected from liability for defamatory content
111th Cong. (2009–2010) (calling for additional disclosure requirements). Thus, this Arti-
cle will not discuss the case’s impact in detail.  Nevertheless, the large donations and anon-
ymous donations that it has made possible have both clear and troubling implications for
democratic participation that will hopefully be addressed in future legislation.
262. CORRADO ET AL., supra note 25, at 40–41 (presenting a package of reforms to ex- R
pand the role of small donors in politics, including multiple matching funds for small
donors); Malbin, supra note 25, at 20 (arguing that the public financing system should be R
redesigned to encourage participation by small donors and discourage dependence on
large donors).
263. See Daniel W. Butrymowicz, Note, Loophole.com: How the FEC’s Failure to Fully Regulate
the Internet Undermines Campaign Finance Law, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1708, 1741–43 (2009)
(arguing that including Internet communications that cost more than $500 in the FEC’s
definition of “public communication” would reduce the exploitation of regulatory
loopholes).
264. See Daniel Schuman, Legislation Intended to Respond to Citizens United, SUNLIGHT
FOUND. BLOG (Jan. 27, 2010, 12:27 PM), http://blog.sunlightfoundation.com/2010/01/
27/legislation-intended-to-respond-to-citizens-united/ (describing and providing refer-
ences to thirteen bills and amendments intended to respond in some way to Citizens
United).
265. See generally Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315-19 (1992) (holding that
states may only require retailers to collect state taxes if they have in-state offices or stores);
Olga Kharif, The Surge to Impose Online Sales Taxes, BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK (Apr. 26, 2009,
10:12 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/apr2009/tc20090426_51
0375.htm (detailing recent debates over extending state sales taxes onto the Internet and
noting the industry argument that preventing this tax extension will protect small busi-
nesses from being “‘strangled in their cribs’”).
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posted on their sites by third parties.266  The FEC thus far has been
similarly reluctant to regulate online campaigning and fundraising.267
In 2004, in Shays v. FEC,268 the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia directed the FEC to promulgate regulations
to bring the Internet under the coverage of BCRA.269  Resisting ex-
pansive online regulation, the FEC updated its regulations to include
only paid advertising online.270  Although paid-for advertising consti-
tutes a large portion of political speech in other media—from televi-
sion and print advertisements to banners and signs—it plays a
relatively limited role on the Internet.271  The rest of online communi-
cations, like the political conversation on blogs and discussion boards,
were not considered “public communications” under the law and
were left largely unregulated.
Despite concerns of burdening the Internet, there are two impor-
tant reasons why policymakers should seriously consider expanding
fundraising regulation to encompass online fundraising.  For the past
ten years, Internet fundraising has steadily expanded its role in Ameri-
can politics, with no end in sight.  The important question for a regu-
lator is not whether online fundraising should continue to expand,
but how it should do so.  Short of a possibly unconstitutional ban on
fundraising over the Internet, it will only continue to grow.  In the
266. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) (protecting online providers from liability for in-
formation composed by third parties by requiring that “[n]o provider or user of an interac-
tive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider”).
267. For details on the FEC and Internet communications, see Internet Communications
and Activity, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/in-
ternetcomm.shtml (last updated June 2007).
268. 337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004).
269. See id. at 70 (“To permit an entire class of political communications to be com-
pletely unregulated irrespective of the level of coordination between the communication’s
publisher and a political party or federal candidate, would permit an evasion of campaign
finance laws . . . .”).
270. Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. 18,589, 18,589 (Apr. 12, 2006) (codified at
11 C.F.R. § 100.26 (2010)) (“The revised definition of ‘public communication’ includes
paid advertising placed on another person’s website . . . .”); see also 11 C.F.R. § 100.26
(providing that “general public political advertising shall not include communications over the
Internet, except for communications placed for a fee on another person’s Web site”).  For
more details on Shays and FEC regulation of online campaigning, see Butrymowicz, supra
note 263. R
271. The FEC acknowledged the limited role of paid political speech on the Internet in
its notice of proposed rulemaking in response to Shays v. FEC.  Internet Communications,
70 Fed. Reg. 16,967, 16,969 (Apr. 4, 2005) (codified at 11 C.F.R. § 100.26) (“[T]he Com-
mission anticipates that the proposed definition would have an extremely limited impact, if
any, on the use of the Internet by individuals as a means of communicating their political
views, obtaining information regarding candidates and elections, and participating in polit-
ical campaigns.”).
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past decade, scholars have generated a large amount of literature ar-
guing that there is something special about election law that requires
“a different type of jurisprudence.”272  Singling out political speech
and political contributions for regulation is nothing new, and the pro-
posals discussed in this Part are no different.  Most of these proposals
are not solely targeted at online fundraising—requiring in-
termediaries to disclose their identity when they earmark members’
donations, for instance, applies to offline bundlers just as much as it
applies to online IFGs.  Nevertheless, the proposals seek to address
challenges that are brought to the fore by online fundraising itself.
Regulation of online fundraising can accomplish two important
tasks: Regulation can help to mitigate or eliminate the risks raised by
online fundraising, and regulation can help to expand online fun-
draising’s enhancement of democratic participation.  Leaving online
fundraising unregulated as it continues to expand, however, will only
maintain an increasingly fragile status quo that is threatened by the
risk of fraud and inequity.
The remainder of this Part proposes two specific policies to ad-
dress some of the risks raised by online fundraising and a third policy
to help draw in more small online donors and increase their value for
campaigns.
A. Regulating Risk
Many of the dangers raised by online fundraising were outlined
in Part III.  Increasing emphasis on online fundraising by campaigns
will only exacerbate these dangers.  There are three risks in particular
that, if left unchecked by regulation, will continue to expand: the gap
in access created by the digital divide, anonymous donations and the
risk of contribution fraud, and the fact that online fundraising in-
termediaries are not required to disclose their role in securing
earmarked donations.  The risk of the digital divide is by no means a
uniquely political problem and has been discussed in detail else-
where.273  Beyond identifying its importance and the importance of
regulatory support to ensure that it is properly addressed, this Article
272. E.g., Heather K. Gerken, Keynote Address: What Election Law Has to Say to Constitu-
tional Law, 44 IND. L. REV. 7, 8 (2010).
273. See generally, e.g., AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., HOME BROADBAND 2010, at 2
(2010), available at  http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/
Home%20broadband%202010.pdf (detailing recent changes in Internet access that sug-
gest a decreasing, but not disappearing, digital divide); U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L
TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., A NATION ONLINE: ENTERING THE BROADBAND AGE 13–15
(2004), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/anol/NationOnlineBroadband04.pdf
(analyzing broadband usage and distribution in the United States); Anthony Sciarra, Mu-
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will not address it in detail.  The other two risks, however, have been
greatly exacerbated by the rise of online fundraising in particular and
deserve additional consideration.
1. Anonymous Donations and Donor Fraud
Donation fraud is a serious concern, both online and offline, but
the sheer volume of small donations and the opportunity for anonym-
ity that Internet fundraising offers make it a particular problem on-
line.  A public matching fund for general election donations, a central
element to several recent policy proposals, would make donation
fraud even more tempting.274  If small donations are matched by pub-
lic money, they may double, triple, or quadruple in value. Increased
value will create increased incentives for donors and campaigns to
commit fraud.
At the same time, there are reasons to be cautious when consider-
ing regulation to prevent donation fraud, particularly online.  First,
constraints on online donations could increase the transaction costs
for voters and campaigns, depressing the growth rate of Internet con-
tributions and reducing the positive impact of online fundraising.
Second, it is not clear how significant donor fraud truly is, and
whether the increased transaction costs that may be necessary to com-
bat it are worth the cost.275  Many of the potential solutions to these
concerns impose significant burdens on campaigns, donors, or both.
One could, for instance, require that all donors use credit cards, elimi-
nating the use of anonymous gift cards.  This would require that do-
nors provide a valid, matched billing address and would ensure that
any political donor satisfies a credit card company’s fraud check.
While this requirement would not be failsafe, it would likely prevent
many attempts at fraud.  Unfortunately, according to the Federal Re-
serve, some twenty-seven percent of American families do not have
credit cards276 and thus would be excluded from online fundraising if
this limitation were implemented.
Another possible solution would be to require that online donors
provide positive identification, such as a social security number or
driver’s license number before contributing online.  National legisla-
nicipal Broadband: The Rush to Legislate, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 233, 255-57 (2007)
(presenting municipal broadband as a strategy to address inequity in Internet access).
274. See infra Part IV.B.1.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 195–201. R
276. See Brian K. Bucks et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2004 to 2007: Evidence
from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 95 FED. RES. BULL. A1, A46 (Feb. 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2009/pdf/scf09.pdf.
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tion that required states to generate voter IDs along with their voter
registration rolls could even generate a unique ID designed solely for
the purpose of political contributions.  Although this solution would
be even more effective than requiring credit cards, it could greatly
increase the transaction costs of online contributions.  Donors might
be unwilling to disclose such sensitive information to political cam-
paigns over the Internet and might opt out of online donations alto-
gether.  Alternatively, donors might lose a rarely used identifier like a
voter ID.277  The question of voter identification has become particu-
larly controversial in recent years, with numerous authors warning
that such a requirement could severely depress voter turnout.278  Cam-
paigns would also become even more tempting targets for identity
thieves.  To verify the identity of donors, campaigns would need access
to the appropriate government databases—a procedural and techno-
logical challenge that would further expose sensitive information to
leaks, mishandling, and outright theft.
The risks posed by each of these solutions suggest that they
should not be adopted without certainty of success, clear evidence of
widespread contribution fraud, and a careful consideration of the
consequences.  In light of the lack of evidence to analyze from previ-
ous elections279 and the significant risks raised by each proposal, it
makes sense to consider a compromise solution that could reduce the
risk of online fraud while avoiding harmful unintended
consequences.
Both of the policies discussed above center around a single mech-
anism: Contributors must provide identifying information that can be
277. One potential benefit of a voter ID requirement, however, is that it would limit the
ability of noncitizens to donate, a problem that received significant attention in 2008. See
generally supra text accompanying note 197. R
278. See, e.g., Gilda R. Daniels, A Vote Delayed Is a Vote Denied: A Preemptive Approach to
Eliminating Election Administration Legislation That Disenfranchises Unwanted Voters, 47 U. LOU-
ISVILLE L. REV. 57, 58-59 (2008) (arguing that requiring voter IDs is similar to the “Bull
Connor” methods of the past, which thwarted African American political participation,
when it bars eligible citizens from voting); Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost of the Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter
Identification Laws, and the Price of Democracy, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2009) (argu-
ing that “photo identification laws represent a continuation of the use of economic forces
as a way to block people of lower economic status from participation in the electorate”);
Samuel P. Langholz, Note, Fashioning a Constitutional Voter-Identification Requirement, 93
IOWA L. REV. 731, 788 (2008) (arguing that if legislatures wish to construct a constitutional
photo identification requirement, they must take steps to ensure that every voter has access
to such identification so that voter turnout is not affected, among other requirements).
But see Stephen Ansolabehere, Access Versus Integrity in Voter Identification Requirements, 63
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 613, 623–25 (2008) (arguing that survey results show that requir-
ing voter identification will not exclude voters and is unlikely to discourage voter turnout).
279. See generally supra Part III.A.
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linked to a verifiable address.  This requirement does not prevent
fraud altogether—an identity thief could still use someone else’s iden-
tification—but it does increase the barriers to fraudulent
contributions.
A similar barrier can be achieved without requiring donors to
provide credit cards or unique identifiers.  Instead, donors could be
required to provide valid physical and e-mail addresses for each dona-
tion. Further, fundraising groups could be required to verify the valid-
ity of these addresses upon donation, and store them after donation.
Although this regulation presents a lower boundary than the previous
proposals, it still provides a measure of deterrence and raises far fewer
risks.
In addition, fundraising intermediaries could be required to log
the Internet protocol (“IP”) address of the computer used to make an
online donation.280  The IP address provides a digital address for the
donor’s computer somewhat like, though less precise than, the infor-
mation a physical address provides about a donor’s home.281  An IP
address log will not provide a definite donor identity because IP ad-
dresses change, can be masked by technically savvy users, and point to
computers rather than individuals.282  An IP log will, however, provide
another point of verification that, in addition to donors’ physical and
e-mail addresses, can be used to locate patterns that might indicate
fraud.  Software could monitor these patterns and flag suspicious
contributions.
This limited solution will not prevent all fraud, but neither would
either of the solutions discussed above.  Instead, it will make online
fraud more difficult and provide for enhanced recordkeeping that will
allow researchers to determine how widespread a risk is really posed
by donation fraud.  Based on this additional evaluation, more severe
measures could be adopted for future election cycles if deemed neces-
sary.  Just as importantly, this proposal places no additional burden on
intermediaries or donors.  Donors, in fact, will see no difference in
the forms they must fill out to donate to most intermediaries—they
will simply receive an error if they enter a nonexistent address.  In-
termediaries already gather this information to help them follow up
280. For more detail on how IP addresses function and how they could be used to track
an Internet user, see Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal
Standard, 118 YALE L.J. 320, 328 (2008).
281. See id.
282. See id.; Ned Snow, Copytraps, 84 IND. L.J. 285, 298 (2009) (explaining how online
violators of copyright law might choose to mask their IP addresses); see also, e.g., Tor: Over-
view, TOR, http://www.torproject.org/overview.html.en (last visited Feb. 27, 2011)
(describing Tor, a free service that masks the identity of its users online).
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with their members, and there are numerous tools online that would
allow intermediaries to validate physical addresses.283
This iterative approach avoids burdening the benefits of online
fundraising listed in Table 2, provides some initial deterrence to
would-be perpetrators of fraud, and allows regulators to gather more
data and to refine future approaches.
2. Requiring Disclosure of Earmarked Contributions
Federal Election Campaign Act disclosure requirements currently
fail to capture some of the most important information concerning
online donations.  Federal Election Campaign Act disclosure reports
indicate the source of each donation, but because online fundraising
intermediaries facilitate donations by their members, a crucial piece
of data (who earmarks the data) is left out.  Five thousand RedState
readers who respond to the website’s plea to donate to a particular
candidate are indicating their own support, but they are also indicat-
ing RedState’s influence.284  If there is no report of how these dona-
tions were delivered to candidates, a crucial piece of the pattern of
political influence will go unreported.  This problem, in fact, is identi-
cal to the disclosure problem posed by nonlobbyist bundlers; FECA
does not require campaigns to report their earmarking.285
Campaigns almost certainly already know this information.
Whenever a web surfer visits a page, most browsers provide a record of
the last page the surfer visited, allowing campaigns to easily recon-
struct from where their donors are coming.286  An even more certain
method of reporting might require online intermediaries that drive
283. See, e.g., U.S. POSTAL SERV., ADDRESS INFORMATION SYSTEM PRODUCTS TECHNICAL
GUIDE 89 (Oct. 2010), available at http://ribbs.usps.gov/addressing/documents/
tech_guides/pubs/AIS.pdf (outlining various services provided free by USPS for online
businesses, including address verification); CORRECTADDRESS, http://www.correctaddress.
com/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (advertising an address verification software product);
Mastering the UPS Shipping API: Getting Started, MARKSANBORN.NET (Sept. 19, 2008), http://
www.marksanborn.net/howto/mastering-the-ups-shipping-api-getting-started/ (detailing
API services offered by UPS, including the UPS Address Validation Tool).
284. See supra text accompanying notes 112–16 (noting the role of partisan blogs in R
fundraising).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 95–99. R
286. PHP, http://www.php.net/manual/en/reserved.variables.server.php (last updated
Feb. 28, 2011) (defining “HTTP_REFERER” as “[t]he address of the page (if any) which
referred the user agent to the current page”).  By using this data, software developers can
build a website that tracks the last site the viewer visited.  Similar resources exist in a wide
range of programming languages that are used to develop websites.  For example,
HTTP_REFERER Test, KARMAK.ORG, http://karmak.org/2004/reftest/ (last visited Jan. 18,
2010), is a working sample of HTTP_REFERER; after clicking on the “Click here to test”
link, the new page will display the URL of the page referring that page.
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voters to candidate donation pages to embed a small identifying tag in
the link that is selected by members.287  Candidate’s websites could
automatically decipher this identification tag and append it to any do-
nation received.288  This proposal would require very little effort on
the part of campaigns or fundraising intermediaries and is already
widely used in online advertising, in which positive identification of
surfers’ origins is vital to companies’ business models.289  It can be
equally effective in the political context.
Finally, fundraising platforms like ActBlue gather earmarked do-
nations themselves and remit periodic checks to campaigns that re-
present many aggregated donations.290  Intermediaries should be
required to accompany these donations with transactional data that
identifies each individual donation and links that donation to the in-
termediary.  Campaigns, in turn, should be required to disclose this
additional detail, including the earmarking intermediary and the do-
nor for donations above the minimum disclosure threshold.  Requir-
ing intermediary information for all donations will ensure that all
online fundraising intermediaries, whether they drive contributors to
donate directly or aggregate and deliver their donations themselves,
will have their earmarked contributions clearly identified and their
potential influence made transparent through FECA disclosures.
This would not be a perfect system.  For example, members who
were convinced to donate by their intermediary, but who navigated to
a candidate’s page themselves rather than by clicking on a link from
the intermediary’s homepage, might be unidentifiable.291  In addi-
tion, if one fundraising intermediary used another intermediary to de-
liver funds—for instance, Daily Kos might drive its members to
contribute to a candidate via ActBlue—then only the final facilitating
link would be recorded.  Nevertheless, this simple recording system
287. See, e.g., Justin Cutroni, Measure Online Advertising with Google Analytics, THINK VITA-
MIN (Oct. 16, 2007), http://thinkvitamin.com/uncategorized/measure-online-advertising-
with-google-analytics/ (describing how tagging advertising links works and providing
examples).
288. See id. (“Once Google Analytics knows which [link] the visitor responded to it
stores the information in a cookie on the visitor’s machine.  From that point forward, as
long as the cookie exists, Google Analytics can connect the visitor’s actions with the
originating [link].”).
289. See id.
290. ActBlue Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 126 (“At least once a week we send R
checks to candidates aggregating all the donations they’ve received since the last time we
sent them a check.”).
291. See generally Cutroni, supra note 287 (describing “link tagging” and its use in track- R
ing originating online activity).
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would capture vastly more earmarking data than is currently
recorded.
One might also argue that reporting earmarking is unnecessary,
because online intermediaries must publicly announce their donation
drives to effectively raise funds.  Any information provided in the an-
nouncement, however, will be in a mass of disconnected online press
releases, formatted as the intermediaries choose and including only
the data they choose to provide.  Such information hardly offers a reli-
able resource for public scrutiny.  Including earmarking in FEC dis-
closure reports would establish a single destination for easily
comparable data on all intermediaries, an important step in exposing
the breadth and depth of their influence.
In addition to their benefits, additional disclosure requirements
pose three risks.  First, additional requirements could burden cam-
paigns—increasing the campaign-side transaction costs of online fun-
draising.  The additional reporting will be very easy for campaigns to
implement, however.  Indeed, campaigns already gather much of the
necessary data as part of their efforts to understand where their do-
nors come from and how best to solicit continued support.  Second,
additional disclosure could increase the contributor-side transaction
costs of online fundraising, discouraging donations from donors who
are unwilling to reveal their identities.  Donors’ identities are already
disclosed for donations of more than $250,292 and the new regulation
should not change this.  For donations below $250, only the earmark-
ing data for donations should be disclosed (for instance, the fact that
MoveOn.org has facilitated a donation of $50).  If this limitation was
maintained, the new policy would not further burden donors.
Finally, and perhaps most concerning, where donor identities are
reported, attaching this information to their donation’s earmarking
intermediary will reveal not only the candidates whose donors choose
to support but also the intermediaries with whom they choose to affili-
ate.  A donor clicking a link to donate posted on Firedoglake.com or
Teapartypatriots.org, for instance, will have his intermediary affilia-
tion revealed in FEC disclosure reports.  The Supreme Court has
made very clear that the First Amendment right to affiliate with
groups includes the right to do so anonymously for fear that members
of controversial groups, such as the NAACP in the pre civil rights era
South, might be intimidated into abandoning their affiliations.293
292. See supra text accompanying note 53. R
293. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462–66 (1958) (holding that compelling dis-
closure of the membership roles of the Alabama NAACP would violate its members First
Amendment right of association and that there is a “vital relationship between freedom to
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To avoid this problem, intermediary earmarking data should not
be linked to donor identities.  Instead, earmarking data with no donor
identifiers should be reported for all donations—no matter how
small.  Separately, individual transactions by donors aggregating over
$250 would be reported with donor identities.294  This would em-
power the public to scrutinize online fundraising intermediaries’ in-
fluence and protect donors’ privacy.  There is a small risk that
correlations could be identified based on donation amounts and dates
for donations over $250 made to local candidates, thus exposing the
intermediary affiliations of large donors.  If a particular candidate re-
ceived a single $250 donation on a given day, for instance, this could
be linked to a separate disclosure that a $250 donation was earmarked
for that candidate by a particular fundraising intermediary.  This
would be a relatively rare occurrence.  Further, the Supreme Court in
Buckley v. Valeo concluded that the sufficient government interest in
transparency warrants the disclosure of the personal details of large
donors.295  Thus, one might conclude that this is a worthwhile risk.
To be safe, however, earmarking disclosures could be made on a
monthly, rather than a daily, basis—an intermediary would disclose
that it earmarked one hundred $250 donations and thirty $50 dona-
tions during a one month period, for instance.  This would greatly
reduce any risk of unintended disclosure by data correlation and have
little impact on the value of the disclosed data.
B. Fostering Small Donors and Expanding Democratic Participation
Increasing candidates’ reliance on small donations increases the
number of citizens who participate in elections and political de-
bate.296  It privileges donors who give without a personal connection
to the candidate and without any hope for direct influence.297  An
increase in small donors also brings more donors into the political
associate and privacy in one’s associations.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976)
(“[T]he invasion of privacy of belief may be as great when the information sought con-
cerns the giving and spending of money as when it concerns the joining of
organizations . . . .”).
294. See supra text accompanying note 53. R
295. 424 U.S. at 66–68, 80–84.
296. See, e.g., Ellen L. Weintraub & Jason K. Levine, Campaign Finance and the 2008 Elec-
tions: How Small Change(s) Can Really Add Up, 24 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 461, 472–73 (“By the
conclusion of the campaign, Obama claimed to have over 3 million individual donors who
made a total of 6.5 million donations online.  Six million of these contributions were for
less than $ 100 each.” (footnote omitted)).
297. See id. at 472–74 (“Raising funds over the Internet substantially limits the opportu-
nities for the kind of actual or apparent improper influence that can arise in direct face-to-
face or telephone solicitations by candidates.”).
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process and leads to greater political engagement, because, once they
have donated, small donors are more likely to volunteer and donate
their time than large donors.298
The Internet has increased the number of small donors in Ameri-
can politics.  There are reasons to believe, however, that the kind of
massive mobilization managed by the Obama campaign in 2008299 will
not become the norm without regulatory support.  President Obama
was a high-profile presidential candidate in a high-stakes election that
generated enormous interest, perfectly placed to take advantage of
widespread public demand for change and a young generation of mo-
tivated activists that were already comfortable online.300  Almost all
other 2008 presidential candidates raised the majority of their funds
from large contributions of $1,000 or more.301  In fact, all major can-
didates, including Obama, raised a much higher percentage of their
early funds from large donors, turning to small donors only after the
candidate achieved a sufficient level of notoriety and had become es-
tablished as a serious contender.302
The numbers are even more telling in lower-profile campaigns.
In 2008, Senate candidates raised only fourteen percent of their total
take from individual donors who donated an aggregated total of $200
or less.303  For House candidates, it was even lower: eight percent.304
The numbers drop further for incumbent candidates (nine percent in
Senate races and six percent in House races).305  In fact, all candidates
raised a smaller percentage of their funds from small donors in 2008
than in 2000.306
Although the Internet offers the promise of a rapid rise in the
ability of candidates to rely on small-value donations, this promise has
not yet been realized for the vast majority of elections.  The more lo-
cal and lower profile a race, the more its candidates turn to large do-
298. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. R
299. See supra note 296. R
300. Cf. Weintraub & Levine, supra note 296, at 474 (“While it is likely that a greater R
percentage of political fundraising will take place via the Internet in the years to come, the
key question is whether Obama’s extraordinary fundraising success can be duplicated by
other candidates.  Was this ‘lightening in a bottle,’ a unique set of circumstances having
more to do with a particular candidate at a particular time than with any structural innova-
tions in his fundraising strategies?”).
301. CORRADO ET AL., supra note 25, at 15–16. R
302. See id. at 18.
303. Id. at 20.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 21–22.
306. Id.  In 2000, Senate candidates raised seventeen percent of their funds from donors
aggregating to less than $200, and House candidates raised fifteen percent. Id.
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nations.  Even if the small donor revolution that helped lift Barack
Obama to the presidency continued unabated for other presidential
candidates—which is by no means guaranteed—it seems unlikely that
it will penetrate to lower profile races without support.
Careful regulation can provide this support, as fundraising pat-
terns from state elections illustrate.  In 2006, state candidates from
Maryland, the state representing the median distribution of candidate
fundraising, raised only nine percent of their funds from donations of
$100 or less and only fourteen percent from donations of $250 or
less.307  While most states presented fundraising statistics that were
similarly skewed to large donors,308 candidates from several states
raised significantly higher percentages from small donations.  State
candidates from Minnesota, for instance, raised forty-five percent of
their funds from donations of less than $100.309  Similarly, state candi-
dates from Vermont raised twenty-six percent of their funds from
small donors.310  Both states, as well as other states that showed in-
creased candidate reliance on small donations, had government pro-
grams that created incentives for candidates to focus on small
donations.311  Minnesota offered partial public funding to its candi-
dates, employed low contribution limits, and offered a state rebate for
small donations.312  Vermont required candidates to raise significant
funds from small donations to qualify for public financing.313  In each
case, regulation seems to have successfully refocused campaign fun-
draising on small donations.  This is especially true for low profile can-
didates whose counterparts in other states without such regulation
relied mainly on large donors.
1. Public Matching Funds for Small Donations
Although a federal public matching program currently exists, it
only matches small donations during primaries, is available only to
presidential candidates, and does not provide sufficient incentives to
307. Id. at 24–25.
308. In Alabama, for example, state candidates raised only two percent of funds from
donations of $100 or less, but twenty-one percent came from donations of $1000 or more.
Id. at 24.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 23.
312. Id.
313. DEBORAH L. MARKOWITZ, GUIDE TO VERMONT’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 12 (2008),
available at http://vermont-elections.org/elections1/2009-10CFGuideRev5.25.10.pdf (ex-
plaining that a candidate for governor must collect contributions amounting to no less
than $35,000 collected from no fewer than 1,500 qualified individuals contributing no
more than $50 each).
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focus candidates on small donors.314  To increase the incidence of
small online donors, this program should be reconceived and ex-
panded.  Although it would be primarily aimed at the rising number
of small donations that have been made online, such a program could
match offline donations as well.  Small offline donations, though per-
haps more challenging to raise and coordinate, are at least as valuable
as acts of democratic participation as online donations.
In light of the relevant case law, designing a matching fund would
require careful planning. Buckley, for instance, held that restricting
“the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”315
Citizens United reinforced and expanded this sentiment by holding
that the Government cannot “impose restrictions on certain disfa-
vored speakers.”316  While both of these statements concerned ex-
penditures,317 not contributions—and Buckley drew important
distinctions between the two318—the tone of Citizens United suggests
that an expansion of these principles to contributions is far from out
of the question.  Thus, any matching fund should be especially cau-
tious if it explicitly restricts larger contributions in favor of smaller
ones, lest it be interpreted as a restriction “distinguishing among dif-
ferent speakers” or “taking the right to speak from some and giving it
to others.”319
Currently, primary candidates who meet certain qualifications
can receive public matching funds on a dollar-for-dollar basis for the
first $250 contributed by each donor, while general election candi-
dates may request a flat grant of some $84,000,000.320  In return for
such funding, candidates commit to use only public funds during the
general election and “are subject to limits on the amount they may
spend in the primary and general election campaigns.”321
In order for a voluntary matching program to be effective, candi-
dates must opt in.  In other words, the benefits of the program must
314. See generally Malbin, supra note 25 (discussing public financing); Public Funding of R
Presidential Elections, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/
pubfund.shtml (last updated Feb. 2011) (same).
315. 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976).
316. 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010).
317. Id.; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47–48.
318. Buckley, 424 U.S. 19–23.
319. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898–99.
320. Public Funding of Presidential Elections, supra note 314 (detailing necessary qualifica- R
tions and available primary and general election public funding for qualifying candidates).
The above amount for the general election reflects the cost-of-living adjustment for 2008.
Id.
321. CORRADO ET AL., supra note 25, at 37. R
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outweigh the cost of taking part.  In 2008, Barack Obama chose not to
seek public funding.322  Without it, he raised more than
$640,000,000.323  John McCain, who did seek public funding, was lim-
ited to $84,000,000, leaving him seriously outmatched in campaign
spending.324  With these events so etched into the recent memory of
candidates, one goal of a restructured public matching program must
be to ensure that all candidates take part, or at least that a single can-
didate’s choice to opt out will not cripple his competitors.  Thus, a
new public matching program should avoid limiting the campaign
spending of candidates who take part.  These guidelines will also help
ensure the constitutionality of a public matching program, should the
Supreme Court, which has been increasingly suspicious of expendi-
ture limits in any form,325 be called upon to evaluate the legislation.
More broadly, the matching program should have one clear goal:
to increase the percentage of candidates’ funds that come from small
donations.326  If successful, the program will increase the number of
small donors that are active in American politics, resulting in an over-
all increase in democratic participation.  To accomplish this goal, pub-
lic matching funds should be available for all federal races, not merely
for presidential candidates.  As the data outlined above demonstrates,
matching programs may in fact be most crucial for lower profile races
where candidates have less public notoriety.  These candidates are
currently the most reliant on large donations.  Evidence from states
with matching programs in place, however, indicates that this reliance
can be shifted.327
A matching fund program could also address another concern
raised by online fundraising: the nationalization of elections.  By
matching only in-state donations, a public matching fund could signif-
icantly increase the relative value of donations from within a candi-
date’s potential constituency.328  This limit would not prevent
candidates from seeking outside support, but it would ensure that can-
322. Kenneth P. Vogel, Obama, McCain Skip Public-Funding Chat, POLITICO (Nov. 17,
2008, 1:52 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1108/15718.html.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Weintraub & Levine, supra note 296, at 476 (noting that “the Supreme Court views R
the concept of ‘leveling the playing field’ as ‘wholly foreign to the First Amendment’”
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976))).
326. See, e.g., Malbin, supra note 25, at 20–21 (noting that the purpose of proposed con- R
gressional campaign financing legislation is “promoting small donor participation”).
327. See supra text accompanying notes 307–13. R
328. See, e.g., Fair Elections Now Act, H.R. 6116, 111th Cong. § 503(a) (2010) (“The
Commission shall pay to each participating candidate an amount equal to 400 percent of
the amount of qualified small dollar contributions received by the candidate from individ-
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didates remained primarily focused on the voters and donors within
their own districts.
To increase the degree to which candidates rely on small donors,
the matching program should increase the value of small donations
relative to large donations.  A program that provided a four-to-one
match for all donations of $200 or less, for instance, would quadruple
the value of these small donations.329  The remainder of this Section
will use this example—a four-to-one match of donations of $200 or
less—to discuss possible public matching programs.  It is not the in-
tent of this Article to suggest that this is the only, or optimal, dollar
level for such a program.330  Nevertheless, a four-to-one match of do-
nations of $200 or less provides a good starting point for discussion.
The exact levels of any program that is implemented should be the
result of additional analysis into the size donations regulators feel can-
didates should focus on and the value increase necessary to attract
candidates away from larger donations.  The smaller the maximum
matched donation, the larger the multiple matching funds offered by
public funding would likely need to be.
Increasing the relative value of small donations cannot simply
rely on increasing the size of all donations.  If the same matching
funds that increase small donations also increase large donations,
then the program will achieve little realignment.  Candidates will con-
tinue to focus on large donations, pocketing public matching funds
along the way.331
A four-to-one matching program might solve this problem in
three ways.  First, the program could reduce maximum contributions
for all candidates who opt into the program while using matching
funds to increase the value of small donations.332  At least one current
uals who are residents of the State in which such participating candidate is seeking
election.”).
329. See, e.g., Fred Wertheimer, The $200 Campaign Finance Fix, WASH. POST, Nov. 13,
2008, at A23 (exploring campaign financing, the role small donations of $200 or less
played in the 2008 election, and proposing the four-to-one ratio for matching funds).  Cur-
rently a $200 donation is worth one-twelfth of the maximum donation of $2,400.  A four-to-
one matching program would make a $200 donation worth $800, one-third of the maxi-
mum $2,400 donation. Id.
330. For instance, a public matching program currently running in New York City
matches the first $175 of any private donation to a city candidate by a factor of six-to-one.
CORRADO ET AL., supra note 25, at 40. R
331. Id. at 40–41 (noting how this risk played out in the existing public financing sys-
tem: “Al Gore and Bill Bradley, the leading contenders for the Democratic Party’s presi-
dential nomination in 2000, both accepted matching funds, but each focused on $1,000
donors and raised more than 60 percent of their funds from this source”).
332. If the maximum donation were reduced to $1,000, for instance, a four-to-one
matched $200 donation would be worth four-fifths of the maximum donation.
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proposal takes this approach, requiring that all candidates seeking
public funding agree to a contribution limit that would be “signifi-
cantly lower than the amount that may be accepted by a candidate
who does not accept public funds, but . . . not . . . so low that the level
and administrative burden gives candidates a reason to opt out.”333
Although this program greatly increases the relative value of small do-
nations, it carries significant risks.  To take part, candidates must
agree to forego the large donations that have been their most reliable
source of funding in the past.334  Unwilling to shoulder this risk, can-
didates might choose not to take advantage of the program at all.  In
addition, a matching program like the one proposed could well run
afoul of Citizen United’s distrust of restrictions on political money, as it
clearly limits the ability of wealthy donors to contribute to candidates
who opt in to the program.335
Second, the matching program could match only donations from
donors who donated no more than $200.  Candidates would be free to
also seek $2,400 donations, but their first $200 would not be
matched.336  This would eliminate the risk of candidates choosing to
opt out of the program because of a reduced contribution limit.
Matching only small donations, however, would impose a strange per-
verse incentive on campaigns.  For a four-to-one match of $200 dona-
tions, for instance, any donation between $200 and $800 would
actually cost the campaign money in lost matching funds.337  Cam-
paigns would also incur administrative costs because they would be
required to identify donors whose contributions aggregated above the
maximum matched donation and to return the appropriate matching
funds.  This would burden campaigns, risk errors, and expose the sys-
tem to fraud.338  It would hamper the cardinal benefit of online fun-
draising that has been highlighted in this Article—namely, its low
transaction costs.  It could also result in campaigns dissuading further
donations by impassioned supporters who had reached the matching
limit, but who the campaign did not anticipate would donate enough
to surpass the value of their maximum matched donation.  Not only
333. CORRADO ET AL., supra note 25, at 43. R
334. See Malbin, supra note 25, at 12–13 (purporting that “all of the candidates [in the R
2008 presidential election] started off by relying more on large donors than small”).
335. See supra text accompanying notes 68–71. R
336. In this case, a four-to-one matched $200 donation would be worth one-third of the
maximum donation.
337. Since a $200 donation would be worth $800, a $300 donation, for instance, would
cost the campaign $500.
338. See, e.g., CORRADO ET AL., supra note 25, at 41 (citing the above risks to justify pro- R
posing a match of the first $200 of any donation).
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would this solution impose administrative costs and strange incentives
on campaigns, but potential contributors who sought to participate
could well be turned away by the campaign—hardly a desirable
outcome.
A third solution would take a different approach.  It would not
impose contribution or spending limits on candidates, and it would
avoid placing any perverse incentives on campaigns by matching the
first $200 of any donation, regardless of size.  Instead, every dollar
over the matching limit would be discounted so that the campaign
actually received slightly less than the donation’s full value.  If prop-
erly calibrated, this proposal would keep the maximum donation con-
stant while greatly increasing the relative value of small donations.
Table 3 shows how such a program might be built around a four-to-
one match of the first $200 of any donation, maintaining the current
contribution limit of $2,400.339
TABLE 3
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Each dollar over $200 would actually be worth slightly less than
one dollar for the campaign.  Although it might not seem reasonable
to “discount” donation dollars, it would in fact be quite simple.  Small
donations are matched with government funds.  Until donations
reach the $200 threshold, the matching amount increases at the same
pace as the donation—a donation of $200 would garner a campaign
twice as many matched dollars as a donation of only $100.  Above
$200, however, the amount of matched funds would actually decrease.
339. Id. at 35.
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Instead of each dollar being worth five dollars, each dollar would be
worth less and less until, for a maximum donation, no matching funds
would be received at all. Table 4 demonstrates how this program
might be structured.
TABLE 4
Amount of Matching Funds Provided
Amount Donated
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With a four-to-one match of $200 donations and a $2,400 maxi-
mum donation, for instance, each dollar over $200 would be worth
about seventy-three cents to campaigns.  About twenty-seven cents
would be withheld from the campaign’s matching funds for each dol-
lar donated above $200.340  This proposal would allow campaigns to
seek large donations—thus limiting the risk of candidates opting out
of public funding and reducing the likelihood that the program
would be considered a restriction on speech—but would still refocus
fundraising efforts on small donations.341
Although this solution addresses the shortcomings of the previ-
ous solutions, it nevertheless raises a problem of its own.  The calcula-
tions used to determine appropriate matching amounts are complex,
and the program itself will require considerable oversight and man-
agement.  Perhaps the most complex scenario would arise when a do-
340. These numbers are only examples.  If a different maximum matched donation,
maximum contribution, or matching percentage were desired, these could easily be re-
calibrated.  To determine the proper discount percentage for a different maximum
matched donation, matching percentage, or maximum donation, plug the relevant values
into the following equation: discount_percent = (max_donation – (match_threshold *
match_percent)) / (max_donation – match_threshold).
341. Although the example presented here is a simple linear discount of all donations
above the maximum matched amount, further analysis might demonstrate that a more
progressive discount might be more effective at increasing campaigns’ emphasis on smaller
donations. The exact nuances of how this program might best be structured are beyond
the scope of this Article.
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nor made multiple small donations, eventually surpassing the
maximum matched donation.  At this point, his subsequent donations
should be discounted in value, but the campaign already would have
been awarded matching funds on his earlier donations.  If not care-
fully designed, this situation could force campaigns to constantly re-
turn small amounts of matched funds to the FEC.  Requiring
campaigns to conduct this calculation would impose a significant bur-
den and likely dissuade campaigns from opting into the program just
as strongly as any contribution limit.  Further, its complexity would
leave the program open to miscalculation and fraud.
There is a technological solution, however, that will limit the in-
creased transaction costs for campaigns, enhance transparency in fun-
draising, and still allow matching funds to focus candidate attention
on small donations.  By developing a software package to administer
the assignment of matching funds, much of the transactional work of
public funding, and, indeed, much of the work of campaign disclo-
sure discussed above, can be accomplished automatically by a federal
agency, such as the FEC, or a designated third party.
2. A Digital Monitor for Campaign Finance Management
To administer effective campaign finance disclosure and public
funding programs, data from campaign databases must be monitored,
collated, and processed accurately and quickly.  Certain actions—dis-
closure of information about individual donors and issuing of match-
ing funds—must be taken based on information extracted from
campaign data.  Except in rare cases, these actions are largely
mechanical steps that easily could be predicted beforehand.  For in-
stance, donor information for every donation of over $250 or for every
donor who aggregates above this threshold through multiple dona-
tions must be disclosed.  This process is difficult not because the rea-
soning is highly complex, but simply because it requires the high-
speed processing of vast quantities of data.  These challenges are ex-
actly what modern database systems were designed to address.342  A
software system that could gather data remotely and securely from
campaign databases to determine matching fund amounts, disclose
donor information where appropriate, and monitor for potential
fraud would vastly reduce transaction costs on all sides while simulta-
342. See, e.g., Nonprofit Performance Management, BLACKBAUD, http://www.blackbaud.com/
services/pm/pm_overview.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (touting the ability of its
software to quickly analyze “huge volumes of information” and to “integrat[e] . . . data
from multiple systems, applications, and data sources”).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-3\MLR304.txt unknown Seq: 72 10-MAY-11 13:53
2011] MONEYBOMBS AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION 821
neously increasing the quality of election data and the speed at which
it was made publicly available.
An application programming interface (“API”) is a structured
framework that allows multiple pieces of software to easily communi-
cate.343  Many online services today boast APIs that allow third-party
engineers to tap into and process their data directly.  Google Maps,
Twitter, and Facebook, for instance, all have APIs.344  Application pro-
gramming interfaces often securely transmit sensitive data, allowing
access only to properly credentialed users.345  If campaign databases
all provided consistent API access, a third-party software package
could accomplish virtually all the monitoring and processing neces-
sary to provide fast, reliable disclosure of campaign donations, dis-
tribute matching funds, and recall them when necessary.
Third-party trusted data processing services are nothing new on
the Internet.  Paypal and other financial services have long provided
trusted third-party processing for monetary transactions.346  In this
case, the third-party processor could be a unit within the FEC, a sepa-
rate government entity, or a private, contracted agency.  Allowing its
program secured API access to campaign databases would enable the
generation of continuous, instantaneous disclosure reports and auto-
matically calculate matching funds for candidates.  This kind of
software package would be well suited to administering the public
matching program outlined in the previous Section.  It could use a
similar technique to provide campaigns with access to software that
would validate donor data to help reduce incidences of contribution
fraud.  Campaigns could be required to conduct the checks described
above without being burdened with developing the necessary system
343. David Orenstein, QuickStudy: Application Programming Interface (API), COM-
PUTERWORLD (Jan. 10, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/43487/
Application_Programming_Interface.
344. See Google Maps API Family, GOOGLE CODE, http://code.google.com/apis/maps/
(last visited Feb. 27, 2011); Graph API, FACEBOOK DEVELOPERS, http://develop-
ers.facebook.com/docs/api (last visited Feb. 27, 2011); Twitter API Wiki, TWITTER, http://
apiwiki.twitter.com/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
345. Many e-commerce websites, for instance, use third-party credit card processing
packages with which they communicate using a secure API. See, e.g., Choose an API, AU-
THORIZE.NET, http://developer.authorize.net/api/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (detailing
several API options for e-commerce developers using Authorize.net, an industry leading
credit card processing service).
346. See How Does PayPal Work?, PAYPAL, https://personal.paypal.com/cgi-bin/market-
ingweb?cmd=_Render-content&content_ID=marketing_us/Sign_Up_for_PayPal (last vis-
ited Feb. 27, 2011) (explaining how PayPal helps customers and services transact for goods
on the Internet).
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themselves.347  Rather than forcing intermediaries to remit small por-
tions of matching funds to compensate donations that aggregated
above the matched limit, a software package could simply discount
matching funds that the campaign was due to receive from subse-
quent donations.  If one donor aggregated donations over the maxi-
mum matched donation, the next set of matching funds that the
intermediary received for some future donation would be debited to
offset the necessary discount.  Although administering this program
would be virtually impossible for a human accountant, it would be
fairly straightforward for a well-designed computer management sys-
tem.348  A properly designed third-party service with API access to in-
termediary data could even keep low-value donors anonymous until
they aggregated above the $250 disclosure threshold, at which point
their identities would immediately be disclosed to the FEC.
Direct access would bring other benefits, as well.  Generating real-
time disclosure reports would not merely enhance electoral trans-
parency, it would drastically reduce the burden on campaigns and the
FEC to generate and process the cumbersome periodic filings that are
now the norm.  Further, monitoring software could track data pat-
terns that might indicate donor fraud, helping to provide a clearer
picture of the risks that fraud poses, and stop perpetrators.
Such a system would not be without its risks.  Primarily, the secur-
ity of the system would be paramount.  While the system would not
need to transfer personal information that was not due for public dis-
closure (the system would likely need only amounts, rather than ac-
tual account numbers, to process donations), a wealth of personally
identifying information would flow across it.  Regardless of what third
party was selected to run the system, careful regulatory and technolog-
ical security walls would need to be included to prevent the export
and reuse of voters’ data.  For a government agency, sharing of such
data with other agencies would need to be prevented.  For a private
contractor, strict limitations on the sale or marketing of the data
would need to be imposed.  These concerns could be mitigated to
some degree by carefully limiting the system’s access to voter informa-
tion to only that information necessary to fulfill federal disclosure,
347. Housing the system with a third party could also shield campaigns from liability for
fraud that slipped through the screen.  Campaigns worried about liability might choose to
discontinue online donations altogether—hardly a positive solution.
348. See, e.g., Our Product, MINT.COM, http://www.mint.com/product/ (last visited Feb.
27, 2011) (describing the product’s collection and analysis of personal financial data and
the provision of key alerts regarding recent financial activity).
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public matching, and fraud monitoring requirements, but protections
would still need to be put into place.
Although fears of the risk of data misuse should be carefully ad-
dressed, the system proposed here would not gather any data that is
not already being gathered, processed, and aggregated in national
databases.  Both the Democratic and Republican parties already have
massive national voter databases that aggregate contribution informa-
tion (among other things).349  Developing a government mandated
system would provide several opportunities.  The empowering regula-
tion could dictate what data would be gathered and what data would
be left out.  As the system grew, it would create strong incentives for
intermediaries to enroll.  Even if it were not mandatory, shifting moni-
toring to a third party would greatly decrease intermediaries’ regula-
tory burden.  It would provide a single, reliable data store that
scholars could use to analyze the questions of data fraud and online
engagement that are currently difficult to answer because of the lack
of reliable, neutrally verified data.
A second risk the system would need to surmount would be fear
of unreliability.  The system would need to be highly reliable and in-
corporate fail-safes to ensure continuous functionality.  Whatever the
exact contours of the enabling legislation, the third-party provider
would need to be provided with resources and/or incentives to ensure
the quality of the system’s development and deadlines to ensure it was
developed properly.  Once ready, the system would need to be tested
extensively and phased in over time to ensure that there were no fail-
ures in service.  One benefit of an API-style solution would be that it
would only minimally change intermediaries’ data gathering, mean-
ing that if a flaw were discovered in the third-party system, it could be
temporarily shut down, allowing developers to correct the problem
while intermediaries continue operations without interruption.  Once
corrected, the system could be brought back online and could quickly
catch up by processing all donations made since it was shut down.
Finally, such a system could not entirely automate campaign fi-
nance monitoring and processing.  Operators would need to continu-
ally monitor the system for accuracy and potentially intervene if
inconsistencies became apparent.  Added personnel costs, however,
would likely be offset by the elimination of the need to process cum-
bersome disclosure reports.
349. See Kuhn, supra note 243 (describing the “vast” archived data stores of the Demo- R
cratic National Committee and the Republican National Committee that “merge[ ] tradi-
tional voter statistics on gender, geography, or party identification with consumer and
census data”).
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For all the technical challenges that such a system poses, there
are already global computer systems, such as stock exchanges, that
process data that is every bit as complex and sensitive every day.350  By
following in their digital footsteps, regulators can enhance campaign
finance transparency, reduce its transaction costs, increase accuracy
by reducing the risk of human error, and expand the national capac-
ity for new solutions to the challenges of campaign fundraising.
Each of the proposals outlined in this Section is designed to keep
in mind the factors, benefits, and risks discussed in Part III.  Each pro-
posal minimizes additional transaction costs.  An expanded public
matching fund program would draw in more small donors, who have
been shown to engage more extensively and frequently with fundrais-
ing intermediaries.  It would also increase membership sizes, as more
citizens would have incentives to get involved.  The disclosure of do-
nor earmarking would enhance intermediary accountability, helping
to ensure that online fundraising intermediaries do not become too
powerful.
The policies do not eliminate all the risks of online fundraising
and, in some places, must balance between benefit and risk.  Setting
the low transaction costs of easy donation against the risks of anony-
mous election fraud is a perfect example of this balancing act.  Using
the factors identified in Part III as a guide will help policymakers un-
derstand the online fundraising ecology and the benefits and risks
their legislation must navigate.  By identifying policies that enhance
the benefits and mitigate the risks of online fundraising, policymakers
can be more certain of the impact they will have.  Although this alone
is not enough to ensure that the policies will be successful, it will en-
hance their effectiveness and reduce the risk of unintended conse-
quences that has been so prevalent in campaign finance regulation in
recent decades.
V. CONCLUSION
The website that Trevor Lyman used for his original moneybomb,
ThisNovember5th.com, is still in existence. Lyman, whose fundraising
efforts on behalf of Ron Paul are the classic expression of the rise of a
populist Internet, is himself a fundraising intermediary.  Like
FreedomWorks, MoveOn.org, and Daily Kos, he intermediates be-
350. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, U.S. Exchanges Tout Speed After Tokyo Upgrade, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 6, 2010, 5:58 AM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/
06/us-exchanges-tout-speed-after-tokyo-upgrade/#more-161575 (detailing the speed and
reliability of stock exchanges in Tokyo and New York City).
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tween voters and candidates, channeling information to contributors
and support to candidates.  The fact that he is an intermediary, how-
ever, should not detract from his positive impact on democratic par-
ticipation—from the tens of thousands of new participants that his
website brought into the political process to the transparent, public
way that it generated funds.
The Internet has contributed to the rise of new fundraising in-
termediaries that, like Lyman, wield enormous power but operate very
differently than their offline counterparts.  The Internet is no more a
guarantor of openness than it is a guarantor of direct, candidate-con-
tributor communications.  Examining the ways in which online fun-
draising intermediaries operate, however, reveals a range of important
factors that help encourage increased democratic participation online
and provide tools to hold intermediaries accountable.  The 2008 elec-
tion provided a preview of the Internet’s political potential.  Its impact
will only increase as new media penetration and the potential of on-
line fundraising continue to grow.  Policymakers now face increasing
calls for the regulation of online fundraising.  Careful regulation will
help to mitigate the risks of online fundraising and expand its bene-
fits.  With the right regulation, online fundraising intermediaries can
enhance transparency, empower democratic participation, and en-
gage millions of new voters in American elections.
